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-'y CI .K~S1: 
The development of a theory of motivation in symbolic interaction-
ism is traced, with particular reference to the work of G. H. Mead, 
Kenneth Burke, C. W; Mills, Nelson Foote, and Ernest Becker. Specific 
attention is focused on comparing tpe original theoretical assumptions 
of particularly Mead and Burke to the varying formulations of the prob­
lems of motivation that were later developed by symbolic interactionists. 
Specifically, it is argued that, primarily due to Burke's analysis, the 
t.raditional practice of deterministically explaining human action as 
being the result of variously imagined motives "in" people is, i~ fact, 
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. no explanation at· all but simply a variety of metapho~ical redescrip­
tions dressed in causal vocabulary. Rather than something "in" people 
that determines 'behavior, Burke argued that motives' are a particular" 




Following these assumptions, C. W. Mills was later able to inte­
grate Burke's analysfs with Mead's (et al.) theory of symbolic interac­
,tionism. However, as symbolic interactionism was later developed 
varipus theorists reintroduced the deterministic bias into the probl~m 
of motivation. A critique of this determinism is developed based on the 
"fallacy of tautology." 
It is finally argued that, as a kind of communication that inter­
actants use, the problem of motivation alludes to a sense of "drama" in 
social interaction in which individuals negotiate motives in order to 
influence the behavior of significant others. Thus, motives are seen to 
derive their meaning problematically in terms of how others respond in 
social interaction to an individual's avowed motive. 
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The first formulation of a theory of motivation that was amenable 
to a truiy sociological perspective was developed in 1932, not by a 
sociologist, but a literary critic and poet, Kenneth Burke. This work 
.was published in 1935. A year prior to this a collection of lectures was 
~ssembled that had been delivered by a professor at the University of . 
Chicago, George H. Mead. Mead's work represented a pivotal development 
of a sociological psychology concerning the nature. of "mind," "self," and 
lItsociety," called symbolic interactionism. This is not to say that Mead 
was alone in this endeavor for·indeed, John Dewey, William James, Charles 
Cooley, and James M. Baldwin, among others, also participated. But Mead's 
collection of lectures represented a major, if'pot the major effort in the 
development of symbolic interactionism. Moreover, 'it was Mead's collec­
tion of lectures that was later employed as representing the basis of 
symbolic interactionism, and that eventually was wedded to Burke's work on 
motivation. 
But this did not happen until 1940. Interestingly enough, two major' 
papers were published in 1940 both dealing with the problem of motivation 
in sociology. One was published in the American Journal of Sociology by' 
Robert MacIver (1940), then at Columbia, entitled "The Imputation of 
Motives." The other pape.r was written at .the University Qf Wisconsi~ by' 
C. Wright Mills, then a doctoral candidate, entitled "Situated Actions 

and Vocabulary of Motives." This was published in a rival journal, the 

2 
American 'Sociological Review. 
Sociologically speaking, MacIver's paper represe~t~d the tradi­
tional confusion and misunderstanding in the discipline toward the prob­
lem o,f motives. Basically, the notion of "motivell and 'llcause" was still 
confounded; motives ~ere assumed to involve internal forces or determi­
nants of behavior. MacIver ,(1940:1-2), however, was sensitive to the 
fact that, "The peculiar feature of the imputation of motives is that we 
are asserting a nexus between an overt action and a purely sul?jective 
factor that cannot be exposed to any kind of direct· scrutiny and that is 
not, as such" manifest in the action." But in spite of this embarrass­
ment, MacIver encouraged sociologists not to give up on the notion of 
motive. He concluded by urging further investigatio~ on 
the impulses gen~rating social movements of all kinds, the senti­
ments that characterize the various forms of group solidarity, 
the foci of emotional attachments under different social condi­
tions. . • • There is a sociology of emotion that is almost . 
entirely unexplored and tha~ might throw much light on the prob­
lem of motivation (MacIver, 1940:11-12). 
Theoretically, C. Wright Mills appeared to settle this whole prob­
lem between "cause" and "motives" by integrating Burke with Mead. By 
recognizing that motives are a special type of "lingual vocabulary," and 
that language, "rather than expressing something which is prior and in 
the person . . • is taken by other persons as an indi~ator of futu~e 
actions" (Mills, 1962:439), Mills developed a truly sociological theory 
of motives. Put simply: 
Rather than fixed elements "in" an individual, motives are the 
terms with which interpretation of conduct bl social actors 
proceeds. This imputation and avowal of motives by actors are 
social phenomena to be explained. . . . Motives are names for 
consequential situations, and surrogates for actions leading to 
them (Mills, 1940:~39-40) (emphasis in the original). 
3 
I mentioned above that Mills t 1940 paper set,tled the issue between 
"causestl and ,"motives"; actually that is an over-statement. Although 
currently the issue is probably settled for most practicing sociologists, 
~he controver~y is stiil raging in oth~r social science disciplines, '. 
part~cularly psychology.2 It was not until as la~e as 1958 that a very 
well received work by R. S. Peters (1958) grappled. with the distinction 
between cause and motive from a grammatical and logical point of view, 
and hopefully settled the issue in philosophy. 
I. THESIS FORMAT 
Since 1940, a number of theorists have continued to develop the 
problem of motivation within the larger development of symbolic interac­
tionism. However, as symbolic interactionism has evolved into a number 
of different sub-types, IKuhn (1967) counts seven], so too, the problem of 
motivation has conceptually splintered. At present the literature on 
motivation is frequently confusing and ambiguous due to difference· between 
the various sub-types of symbolic interactionism. For instance, some 
theorists speak of motives as a "special type of communicative conduct,1J 
while others refer to motives as words. Some refer to motives as proper­
ties of situations; other theorists speak of them· as properties of social 
structures. In one sub-theory, motives a!e said to enter into action 
only occasionally, while in another, action is always institutionally and 
historically linked. With these difficulties in mind, the purpose of 
this thesis is to delineate the development of the problem of motivation 
in the history of symbolic' interactionism. The effort is considered 
warranted on the .following counts: 
1. such a study has not yet been made; 
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2. 	 the literature in the sociology of motivation in symbolic 
interactionism is frequently confusing and ambiguous due 
to the differences between the various sub-types of the 
theory; 
3. 	 the sociology of motivation itself is still a recent and 
emerging field that can yet profit from greater attention; 
4. 	 the problem of motivation is squarely situated in address­
ing one of the major problems of sociology in general-­
"what is the nature of social action?" 
The analysis will proceed along the following format. First, the 
wprks of James M. Baldwin, William James, and in particular George H. 
Mead will be analyzed.to establish the original theoretical assumptions 
of symbolic interactionism with special reference to the nature of '''mean­
ing," "a~tion" and "minded behavior." ~econdly, Kenne't:h Burke's (1954) 
Permanence and Change will be analyzed. since it was basically this: 
treatise that C. Wright Mills integrated with symbolic interactionism. 
Thirdly, the problem of motivation will then be traced as it was later 
developed within symbolic interactionism. Lastly, specific attention 
will be focused on comparing the original theoretical assumptions .of 
particularly Mead and Burke to the varying formulations of the problem 
of motivation that were later developed by symbolic interactionists; this 
comparison will afford the basis of critique of this later developm~nt. 
Specifically, it will be shown that, primarily due to the impact of 
Bu~kefs analysis, the traditional practice of deterministically explain­
ing human action as being the result of variously imagined motives "in" 
people is, in fact, no explanation at all but simply a variety of meta­
phorical redescriptions dressed in causal vocabulary. Rather than some­
thing "in" people that determines behavior, Burke· ~rgued that motives are 
.a particular kind' of communication that people use to rationalize given
---	 . 
actions in s~eci£ic situations. In ~erms.of explaining action, therefore, 
the deterministic 'bias drops out of the explanation entirely, and the 
5 
mea~ing of motives then becomes understood as a general problem of com­
munication in social interaction generally. 
Fol~owing these assumptions, C. W. Mills was later able to inte­
grate Burke',s analysis with Mead's (et al.) theory of symbolic interac­
tionism, which is, par excellence, an understanding of action based on 
symbolic communication. • However, it will be argued that, as symbolic 
interactionism was later developed, various theorists, 'including Mills, 
ironically" reintroduced the deterministic bias into the problem of moti­
vation. Rather than deriving their meaning from on-going social int.erac­
tion, motives came to be seen still as features of communication to be 
~ure, but as a particular kind of communication that, in various ways 
"induce,1t "control," and determine action in general. Specifically, 
rather than derive their meaning from on-going social interaction, motives 
came to be understood as certain kinds of "forces" in communication that 
in some way gave meaning and control to interaction. Mead's emphasis 
that meaning is derived and built up through on-going interaction is 
therefore shifted from a position of primary importance to a position of 
dependency on those "forces" imagined to give meaning to interaction. 
The underlying thesis of this essay is that the meaning of all com­
munication in general, including motives as one type of communicative 
conduct, is created and sustained through on-going social interaction. 
Moreover, because interaction is fundamentally problematic, the meaning 
of communicative behavior, including motives, is also variable and prob­
lematic. Thus, it is argued, to suggest that meaning is given to inter­
action by motives, rather than derive their meaning from interaction 
itself, is fundamentally a contradiction to the basic assumptions of 
symbolic interactionism. Moreover, it is also argued, that to explain 
w 
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the meaning of interaction as being the result of ~nything other than 
on-g~ing interactipn itself is fundamentally tautological. The tautology 
. . 
goes as fOllows. The meaning 'of a given behavior or interaction is used 
as evi~ence of another phenomenon or object which can be arbitrarilY', 
envi~ioned--norms) roles, selves, or motives. This object is conceptu­
alized as an independent variable which the original interaction is then 
argued to derive or be dependent on for its meaning. But because, in 
this line of reasoning, the dependent variable (meaningful action) 3. is 
used both as evidence of the independent variable and then explained by 
that variable, the argument is fundamentally circular and thus has no 
, explanatory value. 
Finally, it will be argued that motives should be understood as ' 
terms of interpretation that individuals use to rationalize questioned 
behavior. The problem of motivation, in this sense, alludes to a sense 
of "drama" in social interaction in which individuals negotiate motives 
in order to influence the behavior of significant others. Thus, motives 
are seen to derive their meaning problematically in terms of how others 
respond i~ social interaction to an individual's motive avowal. From 
this standpo~nt, the role of a sociologist as an observer of social 
phenomena, is to describe the various techniques that interactants employ 
in negotiating their situated interactions. It will be argued that, 
dramatistically, the imputation and avowal of motives is one such tech­
nique that the sociologist should attempt to describe and understand. 
CHAPTER II 
G. H. MEAD'S ANALYSIS OF MEANING 
The applicability of early symbolic interactionism to a sociologi-· 
cal. theory of motivation was not in terms of what it had to say about 
motivation but rather, in terms of what it had to say about meaning. 
The reason for this is that Mead, along with William James and James 
Baldwin; was arguing that the meaning of human behavior was socially 
constituted, and thus it could not be ascertained by looking either 
"behind" or "within" the organism for underlying reasons su~h as 
instincts, drives, or emotions. For instance, in 1892 James argued that 
the "self" of the human organism, or that which man calls "me," is a 
socially predicated value. 
In its widest possible sense, however, a man's Me is the sum 
total of all that he can call his, not only his body, and his 
psychic powers, but his clothes and his house, his wife and 
children, his ancestors and friends, his reputation and works, 
his lands and horses, and yacht and bank-account (James, 1968:41). 
In the same sense, Baldwin argued in 1897 that the meaning of 
thought itself was not to be discovered in purging'the organism in an 
endeavor to find "reactive expressions" or "motor attitudes." Baldwin 
(1968: 62) argued, '.'My thought of self is in the main, as to its character 
as a personal self, ,filled up with my thought of Others, distributed 
variously as individuals. . " Baldwin (1968:165) even expanded this 
. sociological sense of meaning to analyze the development of the child: 
But see, in this more subtle give-and-take of elements for the 
building up of the social sense, how inextricably interwoven the 
ego and the alter really are! The development of the child's 
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personality eouid not go on at all without the constant modifi­
cation of his sense of himself by suggestion of oth~rs. So he 
himself, at every stage, is really in part some one else, even 
in his own thought of himself. And then the attempt to get the 
alter stript from elements contributed directly from his present 
thought of himself is equally futile. He thinks of the other, 
the alter, as his socius, just as he thinks of himself as the 
other's socius: and the only thing that remains more or less 
stable, through-out the whole growth, is the fact ~hat there ~s 
a growing sense of self which includes both terms,~the ego and 
the alter. 
In short, the real self is a bipolar self, the social self, 

the socius (emphasis in· the original). ,!S' 

Again, the applicability of early symbolic interactionism to a 
theory of motivation was in its rejection of the notion that the meaning 
of human behavior could be found in these dated notions of motives or 
instincts that, in effect, reduced the significance of behavior to a non­
social plane. Rather, the meaning of the organism was seen to be soci­
ally constituted. It was in this framework that Mead, in particular, 
came tO,develop a theory of Itmind,1I "action" and tlself" within a socio­
logical reference. 
Mead examines this problem through an analysis of the meaning of a 
gesture. lithe term 'gesture' may be identified with these beginnings of 
soc·ial acts which are stimuli for the response of other forms" (Mead, 
1934:43). In this sense gestures, including symbols, become meaningful 
when "they implicitly arouse in an individual making them the same 
responses which they explicitly arouse, or are supposed to arouse, in 
other individuals, the individuals to whom they are addressed" (Mead, 
1934:47). Thus, 
meaning is •.. not to be concerned, fundamentally, as a state· 
of consciousness, or as a set of organized relations existing. or 
subsisting mentally outside the field of experience into which 
,they enter; on the contrary, it should be concerned objectively, 
as having its existence entirely within the field itself. The 
response of one organism to .the gesture of another in any given 
social act i~ the meaning of that gesture ••• (Mead, 1934:78). 
'9 

It is important to note Mead's emph,asis here, on the role of 
"response" in, the construction of meaning. Meaning is ~rgued to exist 
~, 
objectively within the field of experience only on the basis of the 
reciprocity of response' of others to the gestur~s wit'hin a social' act.. 
In this sense, meaning is contingent upon'a "three:-fold relation" within 
the social act: 
this relation of the gest~re of one organism to the adjustive 
response of another organism (also implicated in the given act)', 
and to the completioR of the given act--a relation such that the 
second organism responds to the gesture of the first as indica­
ting or referring to the completion of the given act (Mead, 1934: 
76-7) (emphasis in the original). 
It goes without saying, therefore, that if meaning can be said to 
exist objectively on the basis of the reciprocity of behavioral responses, 
the absence of those responses implies that the interaction either comes 
into question or must await future responses for the consummation of its 
meaning. And furthermore, meaning can not be said to exist if the 
response of others within the given act is withheld or is of a nature 
different ,than the prescriptions implied in the initiating response. 
This is merely to recognize that meaning is problematic and variable; it 
is, contingent on the adjustive responses of the other organisms within 
4the act. 
I.. "MINDED BEHAVIOR" 
Not only did Mead explicate the problem of meaning into a total, 
social-behavioral point of view, he also expanded the issue into explor­
ing what is meant by the no:tion, "mind." Since meaning was now seen as 
an objective, behavioral phenomenon, and not reducible to the "conscious" 












als'o explicate the meaning of "mind" in behavior",l 1=-~rms,! In doing s~, 
Mead again not only returned to draw off some of th~ ba~ic arguments of 
James and Baldwin; he expanded these concepts, especi~lly the notion of, 
, "me," into a theory of mind. Parenthetically, it should also be noted 
that this expansion of James' . notion of "me" represents Mead's most 
significant contribution to symbolic interactionism (see Bolton, 1971). 
As noted above, James and Baldwin depicted the "me" in the experi­
ence of the organism as viewing self as a social object. Mead (1934:38) 

recognized this when he stated: 

The individual experiences himself as such, not directly, but 
only indirectly, from the particular standpoints of other indi­
vidual members of the same social group, or from the generalized 
standpoint of the social group as a whole to which he belongs. 
But Mead makes a brilliant move further. Through the human organ­
ism '·s ability to use language, and therefore symbolize the gestures of a 
given ,social' act,' the individual is able to "import" the conversation of 
social gestures and therefore symbolically elaborate the organized,set of 
responses that others hold toward him. In other words, through man's 
sYmbolic capacity, an individual can "take over" the attitudes or 
responses of others, hold them symbolically before h1m, as it were, and , 
thereby selectively respond to them. This is what is meant by th~ ability 
of "taking the role of the other." The organized sets of attitudes of 
the community that one internalizes therefore represent one aspect of 
the "metl,and is called the "generalized other." Put succinctly, Mead 
(1934:186) says: 

I have been presenting the self and the mind in terms of a social 

process, as the importation of the conversation of gestures into 

the conduct of the individual organism, so that the individual 

organism takes these organized attitudes of the others called out 

by its own attitude, in the form of its gestures, and in reacting 

to that response calls out other organized attitudes in the com­
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munity to which the·individual belongs. This process can be 
characterized in a certain sense in terms of the "pt and the 
"Me", the "Metl being that group of organized attit\ldes to which 
the individual responds as 'an "pt. 
Mind is therefore an on-going communicative behavfor that parallels 
the experience of communication, say, between two people except that it 
is' internalized within the actor. As in the case of two people, where. 
one individual initiates communication through avowal of a gesture, and 
mea~ing then becomes established in terms of the other's adjustive 
response, so too with minded behavior. The "me" represents the organized 
attitudes of the community; the "PI represents the resp0x:>-se to those" atti­
tudes. Mind is therefore "the individual importation of the social pro­
cess" (Mead, 1934:34). 
Perhaps Mead's interpretation of "minded behavior" can best be 
exemplified by an analysis of what is meant by "intention." Due to the 
ability of symbolically objectifying the response of one's self and 
others, an individual can organize an "intended" line of action within 
a situation. Intentions, in this sense, are activities of symbolically 
elaborating actions of a directed sort that the individual can anticipate 
carrying out and thereby selectively respond to. Intentions per se can 
therefore be said to be aspects of an individual's "me"; that is, an 
objectification of how one expects one's self to respond toward a given 
goalo 
The fact should be underscored, though, that as an activity, inten­
tions are not a constant phenomenon "inlt individuals. Like all other 
activities, "intending" can be engaged in or not. This is merely to note 
th~t'not all behavior is intentional. For.instance, both Mead arid his 
contemporary Dewey (1930) recognized that a considerable p.ortion of 
. . 
action is habitual and carried out without intentional deliberation. 
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More,over, in the proc~ss of carefully intending a particular behavior., a 
whole host of other actions that the individual may be performing co­
jointly ar~ carried out without conscious control. 
Thus it is argued that "intending" is one kind or aspect -of minded 
behavior. And like minded behavior, the meaning of an individual's 
actions is not something"that resides "in" the individual; it ,becomes 
established on'the basis of action itself. In this respect, the meaning 
of an intention is not given in and of the intention itself. The meaning 
of an individual's intention. is given by the individual's response to it. 
Thus if actions are of a nature different than what was intended, the 
$ignificance of the original intention is either meaningless or highly 
ambiguous. The point is, as Mead argued, meaning is an on-going product 
of response and not a state of mind or consciousness (cf. Mead, 1934·: 
80-1). And because responses or actions can be variable, the meaning of 
"mind" and "intention" is also problematic. 
An~ther example that can illustrate Mead's theory of mind is that 
of "attitude." Although Mead defends the position that meaning is an 
objective, behavioral phenomenon, he was very much opposed to the extreme 
position of Watsonian behaviorism. The latter position assumed that 
because only overt behavior could be scientifically observed and analyzed, 
covert processes such as "mind," or ttc9nsciousness," could therefore be 
either ignored or denied to exist. Mead (1934:6),on the other hand, 
argued that "There is a field within the act itself which is not external, 
but which belongs to ~he act." Mead is of course referring to the field 





We approach the distant stimulus with the ~nipulatory processes 

already excited. We are ready to grasp the hamme:r before' we 

reach it, and the attitude of manipulatory response directs the, 

approach. What we are going to do determines the line of 

approach and in some sense its manner. 

By attitude, Mead refers to "the beginnings of social acts,".or 
incipient acts. As argued above, through the individual's ability 'to 
symbolically objectify anticipated actions of others and one's self, one 
can prepare future actions and.attempt to guide behavior accordingly. 
This is not to argue, however, that the beginning stages of a social act 
determine the meanin& of the consummated act, for as has been argued, 
the meaning develops as the action itself evolves. In this respect, 
Mead compares attitudinal behavior with hypothetical behavior, or 
behavior consisting of the arousal of the individual toward a given ac­
tion with an imagined or hypothesized consummation of the action., For 
instance, Mead (1938:~5) sugg~sts, "Such an aroused future act has always 
a hypothetical character. It is not until this initiated response is 
carried out 'that its reality is assured." Obviously Mead is reempha­
sizing the problem~tics of action itself, and the constructional nature 
of meaning in action, and not before it. In this sense, an attitude or 
hypothesis is there as a promise; "it becomes true when it fulfills its 
promise" (Mead, 1938:103). 
It is important to note that Mead's theory conceptualizes mind as 
a dynamic process as opposed to a "condition" or a "state." As discussed 
above, the meaning of'behavior is not something that resides "in behavior," 
or "behind" it; behavioral meaning becomes established in terms of the 
response of one organism to the gesture of the other (or the organism's 
response to itself). In this same respect, it is the behavioral response 
of the "I" to the organized sets of attitudes of the I'IMe" that establishes 
14 
,meaning between the two. Meaning is an obj ective, be~ayip:ral dev~lop­
ment bas~d on response. Now just as the meaning between two individuals 
is problematic and va~iable, being contingent on the nature of the 
response of the other, so too, the meaning of minded behavior is contin­
gent on the. respon,se of the "I" toward the "Me." Meaning is not a given., 
but must be underst~od processually as an on-goinglY'established product 
of ~esponse and action. Indee4, Mead is very careful and explicit in 
making this point. Just as the response of the other person is somewhat 
uncertain in, say,. dialogue, so too the response of the "I" toward the· 
"Me" is problematic. Mead (1934:176) explains it in this way: 
I want to call' attention particularly to the fact that this 
response of the "I" is something that is more or less uncertain. 
The attitudes of others which one assumes as affecting his own 
conduct constitutes the "me", and that is something that is 
there, but the response to it is as yet not given. When one 
sits down to think anything out, he'has certain data that are 
there. Suppose that is a social situation which he has to 
straighten out. He sees himself from the pOint of view of one 
individual or another in the group. These individuals, related 
~ll together, give him a certain sense of self. Well, what is 
he going to do? He does not know and nobody else knows. 
Stated somewhat more succinctly, M~ad (1934:178) elaborates: 

The "me" represents a definite organization of the conununity 

there in our own attitudes, and calling for a response, but the 

response that takes place is something that just. happens. There 

is no certainty in regard to it. There is a moral necessity but 

no mechanical necessity for the act (emphasis added) .. 

Mead is arguing an important point here. Namely, there is no form 
of determinism, mechanical or otherwise, that the "me" holds over the 
"1." The "I," as a response of the organism, is always somewhat uncer­
tain. Now some symbolic.interactionists have reacted to Mead's notion of 
the "pr claiming that it is "vague," "mystical," and involving a ''mysteri­
ous biology." None of these claims are warranted. Mead is simply paying 
cognizance to an undeniable, empirical fact concerning human response: 
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men bungle--constantly. Even when all of the facts of any situation are 
known, as in a well-rehearsed play, mistakes in actfng are still made. 
There is nothing vague about this. For instance, Mead notes the baseball 
game where one individual is called upon to make a long pitch. 
Now, it is the presence of those organized sets of attitudes 
that constitutes the "me" to which he as an "I" is responding. 
But what that response will be he does not know and nobody else 
knows. Perhaps he will make a brilliant play or an error. The 
response to that situation as it appears in his immediate experi­
ence is uncertain', and it is that which constitutes the "I." 
(Mead, 1934:175). 
Mead maintained constant recognition of the fact that meaning is 
problematic since it is p~ocessually contingent on the ~ncertain responses 
of others,. and the uncertain responses of one I s self. Mead t s class,i~ 
example ,of this is the absent-minded college professor who started to 
d~ess for dinner and found himself in his pajamas in bed: 
, A certain process o~ undressing was started and carried out mech­
anically; he did not recognize the meaning of what he was dOing. 
He intended to go to dinner and found he had gone to bed. The. 
meaning in his action was not present. The steps in this case 
were all intelligent steps which controlled his conduct with 
reference to later action, but he did not think about what he 
was doing. The later actio~ was not a stimulus to his response, 
b~t just carried itself out when it was once started (Mead, 1934: 
72). 
The significance of Mead's argument can be summarized in one state­
ment: there is a hiatus between words, thoughts, and actions. ' The rela­
tionship between that "I" as responsive actions, and the "me" as 'the 
organized collection of attitudes and symbols that the "I" responds to, 
is not direct. There is a gap. The problem of this hiatus will come up 
again in an analysis of Nelson Foote (1951) and 'E. Becker (1962a; 1964b). 
But Mead's recognition of this hiatus is undeniable. He continuously 
argued that the "Itt and the ''Me'' 
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ar.e separated in the process but they belong together in the 
sense of· being parts of a whole. They are separated and yet 
they belong together .. The separation of the "I" and the "Me", 
is not fictitious. They are not identical, for, ~s I have 
said, the "I" is something that is never entirely calculable. 
The "Me" does call for a certain sort of an "I" in so far as 
we meet the obligations that are given in conduct itself, but 
the "I" is always something different from what the situation 
itself calls for (Mead, 1934:178). 
II. ACTION 
Mead's account of the uncertainty of behavior has been criti~ized 
by some as being vague and unexplainable. Again, this is not the case. 
Mead does provide an explanation and it is centrally involved in his 
processual theory of meaning. Meaning is based on response, and there­
fore, in interactional terms, it is created during the course of, and 
on the basis of, action. Meaning is not inherent in the interactants, 
say, or before the interaction; it develops during the interaction on 
the basis of reciprocal action itself. Or, with the individual, meaning 
does not exist within him, but it develops on the basis of his responses 
to the organized sets of attitudes or objects that he is singling out. 
With this understanding, an explanation for the uncertainty of action is 
forthcoming, and Mead provides it. 
It is only as we act that we become aware of the meaning of our 
actions. As Mead (1934:175-7) says. 
The "I" is his action over against the social situation within 
his own conduct, and it gets into his experience only after he 
has carried out the act. Then he is aware of it·. The 
response enters into his own experience only when it takes 
place ". 
Put another way, "There again I cannot turn around quick. enough to catch. 
myself" (~ead, 1934:174). In this sense, what we frequently believe to 
be the meaning of our actions takes place largely as memory images. 
I . 
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As action flows, the· meaning can be symbolically objectified, as it were, 
but until the action is largely over, there is only sp~culation. Making 
an object of the meaning of our actions, therefore, i~ always somewhat 
delayed and after the fact. This is because of the processual nature of 
meaning being contingent on responses, pot before responses. 
It is only after we have said-the word we are saying that we rec­
I. ognize ourselves as the person that said it, as this particular 
self that says this particular thing; it is only after we have 
done the-thing that we are going to do that we are aware of what 
we are doing. However carefully we plan the future it always is 
different from that which we can previse, and this something that 
we are continually bringing in and adding to is what we identify 
with the self that.comes into the level of our experience only in 
the completion of the act (Mead, 1934:203)( emphasis added). 
Thus we see that one's actions ~an never be fully controlled because 
they are not totally comprehended during action ifself. This is because 
the meaning of our actions requires the response of the "I" before it can 
be said to behaviorally exist. And thus, it is because of this peculiar 
position that the "I" is ~n that makes the comprehension and control of 
our actions problematic. "It is because of the "I" that we say that we 
are never fully aware of what we are, that we surprise ourselves by our 
own actions" (Mead, 1934:174). 
This brings us back to the hiatus between words and actions that 
Mead depicts so poignantly. It is because of this hiatus and the elusive 
nature of behavioral me~ning that makes the comprehension of one's actions 
by and large a product of memory. As Mead (1934:176) said, "And when the 
. . 
response takes place, then it appears in the field of experience largely 
as a memory image. We are doing something, but to look back and 
see what we are doing involves getting memory images." As such, action 
and meaning must be understood as on-goingly problematic, a~d the potenti­
ality of discrepancies, errors, and blunders in action is'always a latent 
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possibility. ,It is, in fact, around these issues that the problem of 
motivation became introduced to symbolic ,interactionism. For the sO,cio­
logical significance of motives is not that they "cause" behavior .. but 
they "justify" or rationalize its discrepancies in social interaction. 
CHAPTER III 
KENNETH BURKE AND THE PROBLEM OF MOTIVES 
Mead clearly detailed the symbolic foundation of men's actions; 
their meaning is to be found within the symbolic interaction of gestures 
and reciprocating responses. Moreover, this same social process is 
integral to the behavior of the individual. Specifically,. by "internal .... , 
izing" the conversation of social gestures and thereby symbolically 
elaborating the organized sets of responses that others hold toward him, 
the individual can act in terms of anticipated mea~ings or responses from 
others. This, however, does not imply that those anticipated responses 
will occur, but that more than likely they will. It is thus in terms of 
.the "generalized other" that the individual also possesses a personal 
sense of "self," or a knowledge of how one can expect others to act toward 
him. 
Burke adheres, to this same understanding. In any given situation 
men act in terms of "orientations," wh~ch amount to a given set of antici­
pations (expectations) of how the environment (including others) will 
,respond toward them. As Burke (1954:18) says, people act in terms of 
a sense of relationships, developed by the contingencies of ex­
perience; this sense of relationships is our orientation; our 
orientation largely involves matters of expectancy, and affects 
our choice of'means with reference to the future 
Thus Burke (1954:18) argues that all men are critics especially in the 
sense'that "man attempts' to extend the range Gf his responses and increase 
their accuracy by deliberately verbalizing the entire field or orientation 
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and interpretation." 
Burke also underscores the fact that, while the tJgeneralized 
other" or one's orientation provides a sense of expectancy toward one's 
environment, this does not imply that responses actually coincide. A~ 
Burke (1954:6-7) suggests, 
Orientations can go wrong. Thus it will be seen that the 
devices by which we arrive at a correct orientation may be quite 
the same as those involved in an incorrect one. We can only 
say tha~ a given objective event derives its character for us 
from past experiences having to do with like or related events. 
Burke (1954:111) also notes that "we are all necessarily involved in the 
momentous discrepancies 'of our present order." 
In spite of the problematic, however, Burke argues along with Mead 
that individuals attempt cognitively to erect a conception of our "s~lf" 
and our world as coherent and approachable. Burke (1954:74) terms'this 
tendency as "piety"; ft ••• piety is a system-builder, a desire to round 
things out, to fit experiences together into a unified whole. Piety is 
the sense of What properly goes with what" (emphasis in the original). 
Thus piety is the tendency, as noted above, of the individual deliberately 
verbalizing the "entire field of orientation" and interpretation. Burke 
(1954:75) carries this notion of piety even further: 

I would even go further in trying to establish this notion of 

piety as a' response which extends through all the texture of 

our lives but has been concealed from us because we think we 

are so thoroughly without religion and think that the "pious 

process" is confined to the sphere of churchliness. 

It is within the notions of "orientations" and "piety" that Burke 
introduces the problem of motivation. Motives are subdivision~ of orien­
tations, espe'cially with reference to the orientation one has within 
specific or co-joined situations. Specifically, motives are "terms of 
interpretation" or rationalizations that are used by the individual to 
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explain his cenduct with respect to his orientation in a given situation. 
As Burke (1954:18) says, 
in the human sphere, the subject of expectancy and the judgemen~ 
as to what is proper in conduct is largely bound up with the 
subject of,mqtives, for if.we know why people do as they do, we 
feel that we know what to expect of them and of ourselves •.. 
(emphasis in the original). . 
As suchJ mptives are rationalizations of one's conduct within given situ­
ations with reference to the individual's orientation. 
The question then becomes, to what to motives refer? As being 
aspects of orientations; motives refer to or represent "short-hand" terms 
for orientations within situations. For instance, Burke (1954:31) gives 
the following example: 
A man informs us he "glanced back in suspicion." Thus suspicion. 
was his motivation. But suspicion is a word for designating a 
complex set of signs, meanings, or stimuli not wholly in con- . 
sonari~e w~th one another. . . . By the word "suspicion" he was 
referring to the situation itse1f--and he would invariably pro­
nounce himself motivated by suspicion whenever a similar pattern 
of stimuli recurred. 
When avowed, motives therefore rationalize conduct by referring to the 
contingencies of a given situation, as these contingencies are interpre­
ted via one's orientation. They function to rationalize by conveying to 
significant others one's interpretation of the contingencies within a 
situation. Burke notes that when one is asked why he closed the window, 
the motive-rationalization most conveniently used refers to the contin­
gencies inherent in the situation: "because the room is cold." As such, 
a motive amounts to nothing more than a rationalistic interpretation of 
a situation. 
This understanding should lend a distinction between an individual's 
intentions and his motives. Typically the two are believed to be one and 
the same. However, as was explained above, intentions represent a 
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subj ectively felt sense of direction within an individual, as,suming, ,of 
course, that the individual is in. fact "intending." A~ an activity, 
intentions involve symbolically objectifying what one will do in a par­
ticular situation with respect to a given goal. But '''intending'' a 
particular $oal does' not automatically insure successful action toward 
the .goal. Indeed, whether or not the intention is meaningful is deter-', 
mined by the nature of the responses to it. Naturally there is, at 
least potentially, a slip between what one intends and what one does. 
There are instances where actions do not achieve their goal, or even do 
not appear to be goal oriented. It is conunonly'in such cases that '''ques­
tions~t arise by significant others requesting an explanation for the', 
observed conduct. It is in such instances 'that motive-justification~ 
are introduced. As rationalizations, avowed motives act'to explain the 
individual's orientation within a given situation and thereby justi~y to 
the signi£icant audience involved the questioned conduct. In this sense, 
avowed motives attempt to normalize the conduct of the situated actors 
(see p. 65). But note that the crucial variable involved in whether a 
motive justification is accepted is not whether the avowed motive is the 
same as the individual's intentions (assuming, again, that the person is 
indeed intending), but rather whether the rationalization satisfies the 
expectations of the social audience. The emphasis here is on whether the 
audience accepts the motive, and not on a congruence between what an 
individual intends (if he intends anything) and what he avows. Indeed, 
it may be the case that the individual's intentions are altogether differ­
ent than his, avowed motives. But this is exactly the distinction between 
motives and intentions. Motives are used to justify behavior to social 
audiences by appealing to the contingencies in situations. But one can 
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not explain an individual's intentions On the basis of his rationaliza­
tion. For instance, an avowed motive may be us~d to pacify a question­
ing audience, and yet at the same time obfuscate the individual's actual 
intentions. Or, an avowed motive may be employed to rationalize a given' 
behavior that was not itself intended but yet called into question by 
others. 
Thus motives and intentions must be understood as altogether 
different phenomena. The latter problem is a subjectively felt sense 
of direction that the individual mayor may not possess. A motive is 
strictly a feature of inter-personal communication in general. As a 
lingual term, a motive functions to justify questioned conduct to s~gni-
ficant others. But on the basis of a rationalization of conduct one can 
~ot determine an individual!s intention. This is not to suggest that in 
everyday conduct significant others do not infer intentions from avowed 
motives. But then it is not uncommon for significant others to be 
shocked at a later date to discover that one's avowed motives were not 
one's intentions. 
As opposed to the traditional notions of ulterior causes or forces 
acting within the individual such as drives or even intentions, motives 
are terms of communication or interpretation that rationalize one's con­
duct if or when it 'becomes questioned by others. 
Any given situation d'erives its character from .the entire frame­
work of interpretation by which we judge it. And differences in 
our ways of sizing up an objective situation are expressed sub­
jectivelY'as differences in our assignment of motive (Burke, 1954: 
35) .' 
The function of motives therefore should become quite obvious. 
While through acts of piety individuals may attempt. verbally or cognita­
tively to build coherent and all~embracing orientations toward the world, 
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surprises~ accidents~ and discrepancies constantly threat~n their very 
foundation. Motives~ as rationalizations for actions~ function inter­
pretatively to bridge the gap between what others expect and what happens. 
I. PERSPECTIVE BY INCONGRUITY 
If motives are merely rationalizations, what then lies deepe,r that 
can explain the reasons for an individual's behavior? This is the ques­
tion of both the skeptic and the scientist. Burke's answer is th,t the 
only "reasons" that can be further specified as explaining the benavior 
of the individual are simply more interpretations or rationalization~. 
The basis of man's behavior is symbolic interpretation within interaction 
of other's and one's environment. What is one man's motive therefore can 
be interpreted by another, man as merely his rationalization. But what 
can be inferred to lie deeper amounts to nothing more than another inter-
pr~tation or rationalization. 
Burke calls the reinterpretation or translation ~f another man's 
motives a Ifperspective by incongruity." This merely involves ignoring 
the rationalization or motives offered by an individual and interpreting 
his behavior within a context wholly incongruent with the individual"s 
context. Perspective by incongruity is usually accomplished through,­
either metaphor~ analogy, or laW-like generalizations. In this respect 
the relatively modern philosophic stance of positivistic science iS,by 
and large based on perspective by incongruity, just as ancient mystics. 
As Burke (1954:222) explains: 
The identity between motives and situations should suggest why 
the modern science of statistics tend to turn up conclusions 
of a strongly mystical cast. By examining a multitude of situ­
ations, individually distinct, ,the scientist attempts statisti­
cally to extract a generalization common to all. The mystic . 
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makes somewhat the same attempt by looking within and naming as 
the ultimate motive a quality of experience common to all" 
This is not to infer, however, that Burke is unaware of the possi­
~ 




whether it be the ancient shaman, Witch-doctor, or the..'m~dern psychoanal­
yst, psychologist, or psychiatrist--substitution of a given motive and 
the bestowal on the individual of a new vocabulary of motives can have 
.pronounced effects, either therapeutically or detrimentally. For 
instance, Burke (1954: lS3) addresses himself to the phenomenon of '-'.exor... 
cism by misnomer": "The notion ,of perspective by incongruity would 
suggest that one casts out devils by misnaming them. It is not the 
naming in itself that does the work, but the conversion downward implicit 
in such naming" (emphasis in the original). Indeed, the contemporary 
work of psychoanalysts bears evidence that, in some cases, effective 
therapy ca~ result by the substitution of one vocabulary-for another. 
(In some cases it can not.) 
But the point that Burke is making is that, if Qnels task is actu­
ally to understand the meaning of human behavior, one must deal directly 
with the behavior and vocabulary of motives of the individual himself. 
Misnaming involves misconceiving. Specifically, first, men act in and 
interpret situations on the basis of their own orientation or logic. 
Therefore, to doubt the credibility of an individual's motive-rationali­
zation for conduct is just simply to negate the fact that people do their 
own "minding." B'urke (1954:21) argues: 
To explain one's conduct by the vocabulary of motives current 
among one's group is about as deceptive as giving the area of 
a field in the accepted terms of measurement. One is simply 
interpreting 'the ,only vocabulary he knows. One is stating his 
orientation, which involves a vocabulary of ought and ought­
not, with attendant'vocabulary of praiseworthy and blameworthy. 
26 
Secondly, if a man explains his conduct within th~'logic of the 
only vocabulary he is familiar. with, it can not ~e argued that his 
rationalizations or logic are invalid or f1awed. Again .Burke (1954:85) ~ 
argues that even the "primitive" orientations of savages is as "realtl·to 
them as conventional logic: 
As a matter of fact the savages behave quite logically, acting 
on the basis of causal connections as established by the tribal 
rationalizations. We may offer ground for questioning the. 
, entire rationalistic scheme as tested by our own technique of 

testing~-but we can not call a man illogical for acting on the 

basis of what he feels to be true. 

Finally, misnaming or translating involves misconceiving the orien­
tation of the individual's behavior in that the very quality most charac­
terist~c of people~-their ability to interpret and choose--is ignored. 
For instance, whether it be by the mystic or the scientist, through. trans-. 
lation or reinterpretation of an individual's vocabulary of motives, 
those motives ~re invariably seen as a func'tion of, ulterior or causa~ 
forces. For instance, a scientist or a mystic would interpret any given 
act of an individual not on the basis of his own interpretation; rather, 
a plethora of forces working on the individual would be introduced, 'rang­
ing from "spells,", "devils," "libidinous drive energy," to "drives,tt 
"instincts," unorms," "roles," "social structures," ad infinitum, ad 
nauseum. Burke (1954: 218) argu,es that, whatever the ratio~ality of the 
translation may be, it tends, 
to shape its accounts of the universal process without regard 
for the most characteristic patterns of individual human experi­
ence: the sense of acting upon something rather than of being 
acted upo~ bX something. The spontaneous words of human motiva­
tion all imply the element of choice; but the scientific (or 
mystical) words imply compulsion. All causal schemes for ex­
plaining our actions begin by eliminating the very quality 
which most strongly characterize our own feelings with regard 
to our actions (emphasis in the original). 
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Finally, an attempt to determine the "real" meaning of an indivi­
dual's behavior through perspective by incongruity is ultimately futile. 
This is simply because translation can go on into infinite regression; 
it has no necessary end. Behavior can be interpreted through metaphor 
and analogy in an endless number of ways; who is to determine which 
translation is more "real" than another, especially in relation to the 
in4ividual's avowed vocabulary of motives. 
To say a man's intentions were in turn shaped by prior factors 
is simply to open oneself to an infinite regress, which the 
orthodox scheme of scientific causality avoids solely by trun­
cating its speculations. It stops at a convenient point, and 
interprets the convenience as cosmic reality (Burke, 1954:23). 
The evidence of this fact is rampant. There exists today a HBabel" 
of interpretations of human behavior each competing with one another. 
"Such interpretative schemes, varying in their scope and thoroughness, 
seem limited only by the time and industry of the heuristically-minded-­
and our examples can be chosen at random" (Burke, 1954:117-8). 
'Burke argues therefore that motives should be understood as sub­
divisions of an individual's orientation to his environment, particularly 
situations. Specifically, motives are "terms of interpretation" o~ 
rationalizations that are used by the individual to justify his conduct 
within situations to significant others. As such, motives do not involve 
"causes" or "determinants" of action. They are rationalizations of 
actions that function as short-hand terms for situations. 
CHAPTER IV 
AN EXCURSIS ON CAUSE AND DETERMINISM IN 
SYMBOLIC INTERACTIONISM:' R. S. PETERS 
The sociological significance of motives, especially as developed 
by Burke, is that they are terms of interpretation within situations 
that function to rationalize an individual's behavior. In this sense, 
motives are not 'to be understood as causal or deterministic forces that 
control an individual's behavior. In an extended sense then, motives 
are theoretically relevant to only a problematic or indeterministic 
theory of, action and meaning. Thus the direct applicability of G. H. 
Mead's analysis of meaning, "minded behavior," and action. (specifiCallY, 
Mead understood "minded behavior," or the dialogue between the "I",and 
"Me" as involving an ant'icipation by the individual of the responses of 
) significant 	others (including one's self) within a given field of action) 
l~ 	 But Mead forcefully stressed the variable and problematic features 
involved in the establishment of meaning. Since meaning is contingent 
,?ri the reciprocal and over-lapping responses of others (or the "I" toward 
the "Me") which are not guaranteed, the meaning of ~ction itself is 
problematic and it involves indeterminate features. Thus the relevance 
of motives to Mead's theory of meaning and action. I~ecause the meaning 
of action is situationally problematic, and in some situations is never 
established, motives, as terms of interpretation, function to rationalize 
and justify the behavior when it is questioned by significant others~-
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In 1958, R. S. Pet~rs explicitly analyzed th~s feature'of indeter­
minance with respect to the probl~m of motivation a~d ~as able then to 
formulate a general crit~que of all determinis~ic t~e~~ies of human 
action . 
.Along, with Burke, Peters (1958:28) argues that "motives are a par­
ticular 'class of reasons. Many sorts of things can be reasons for: 
actions, but motives are reasons of a par1;:icular sort." First, Peters 
,(1958':31) argues that motives relate to action only in situations where 
'actions are questionable and need to be justified: 
,A motive is not necessarily a discreditable reason for acting, 
but it is a reason asked for in a context where'there is a 
suggest10n that it might be discreditable. The demand is for 
justification, not simply explanation (emphasis in the origi­
nal). 
Secondly, motives' are reasons that assign a goal for action,that 
allude to an individual's orientation within a situation (like Burke',s 
"shorthand terms for situations"): 
If we ask for a manls reason for doing something, the implica­
tion is that he is acting in no untoward way. His behavior is· 
within the framework of some rule-following purposeful pattern" 
but it is not clear which rule or which purpose it falls under 
(Peters, 1958:33-4). 
Lastly, Peters argues that motives assign the reason why a person 
is acting. 
By this is meant that the goal which is quoted to justify a 
man's action must also be such that reference to it actually 
explains what a man has done. The motive must be the 
reason why he did whatever he did (Peters, 1958:34) (emphasis 
in the original). 
Peters' analysis of motives thus compliments Bu~ke's, although 
Peters tends to emphasize the central importance of a "question" arising 
within the situation that calls for a justification. At this point, how­




is forthcoming: A motive is a justificatory reason in interactional 
contexts where behavior is being judged by others., It refers to a 
directed disposition toward a goal relative to one's orientation in a 
situation that explains ~ reason for the action. 
I. A CRITIQUE OF CAUSE AND DETERMINISM 
From this conceptual understanding of the problem of motives, 
Peters was able to formulate a general critique of causal or determinis­
tic explanations of human action. The problem of action has tradition­
ally pivoted around the question: "how does the directedness of behavior 
come to be?" Peters (1958:38) argues that, since motives function to 
justify behavior by assigning a goal toward which action is directed, 
many observers have attempted Ira causal interpretation of the logical 
force of the term." Specifically, 
It looks like an analysis of the concept of "motive" of a sort 
that 'implies that whenever we explain an action by reference to 
a motive we both assign a reason ,or goal and a cause. But are 
both elements of this ostensible analysis equally necessary 
(Peters, 1958:38-8) (emphasis in the original)? " 
Obviously not; the causal problem is simply an inference made by 
the observer that in no way is indicated by either behav,ior that is 
observed to be directed, or behavior that is justified by a motive as be­
ing directed. Basically, the attempt to assign causal or deterministic 
force to either the directedness of behavior that is observed or explained 
by a motive is on highly questionable grounds. This is so, Peters argues, 
-because the inferred causal or deterministic explanation amounts simply 
to redescription of a tautological a~count of the behavior. ~or instance, 
the directedness of one's behavior can b~ observed or avowed by an 
individual as an attempt to control the conduct of other people around 
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him.) Acausal or deterministic interpretation can be.inf~rred from this 
observed behavior or motive-avowal as involving, say, a need to dominate 
others. But Peters (1958:20) argues that, all too often this type of 
functional or end-state explanation is redescriptive rather than explana­
tory •••" For instance, with respect to the example above, "what is 
the condition [or need] restored apart from that of the presence of others 
being dominated (Peters, 1958:20)1 Peters (1958:20) argues that 
in the absence of specific states required to define what con­
stitutes the [need], it becomes entirely metaphysical .•• 
Indeed in such cases need-reduction looks like a redescription' 
of goal-seeking in terms which have the normative function of 
stressing the importance of conventionally prescribed pursuits. 
·It is a justification masquerading as a high-level explanation. 
The issue here is one of "tautology." The directedness of action 
can be either 'observed, or if questionable, explained by the individual 
through motive avowal. But any causal force that is attached toward the 
observed behavior or the avowed motive is merely an inference created by 
the observer. Furthermore, this causal inference of the observer con­
stitutes nothing more than a redescription of the actual behavior, except 
in deterministic'terms. This is the basis of tautology: that which is 
used as evidence of something is then explained by that something. For 
instance, an observed behavior' (dominating others) is used as evidence 
of some term (a need, etc.) that is then explained by that term. As 
Peters argues, this is redescription or tautology, and its explanatory 
value is nil (see Stone, 1970). 
Causal or deterministic explanation of the directedness of behavior 
is marked by another discrediting characteristic. Namely, not only is 
deterministic argument fundamentally tautological, but the inferred "cause" 
can vary among an infinite number of imagined sources. As Burke ~rgues, 
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causal explanation involves the possibility of infi~ite regress. Tautol­
~gYJ bein~ fundamentally metaphysical, can enumerate' an infinite number 
. of "causes" that affec:t the behavior, from "devils," IIneeds," to social 
'''norms,'' and "roles." The range of possibilities is limited only by 
the imagination of the theorist. 
Peters un~erscores this point by a similar argument. Causal or 
det~rministic e~planation assumes '*-ll~r IIqthe~ Q~~~itioIl~ bein~' ~.res~e~ , 
•. " \, ". \. .. ~ .. "1', ~ J ,j ~ ~ 
unchanged, a' ch~nge in one varia,&+e :.is a suff~e:t~,n~ cgn~iti~n'l f~l" ~ , 

change in anoth~r" (Peters, 1958; l~)·. (el}iphas~~ :~I':"ille J~rig~!1~.' ~ ~q{' 

. '" ! T ~ ~\ j~: \ i" . .'.• 
tbe tro~ble abo~t postulating th~~ i!nd of an ~xpl~natiQn ~s'ina~ tp~re 
~ I"" '" • 1 ~"'~~. 1. t t; , .. ',• 
Now the tro¥ble about 8~vins tht~ 5q~t qf e~~~~~atiAn q~ b~~q 
~ctians is ·that we can ~ev~r 'P~c.fl ~~ ~etip~'exna~~~~vely ~~ 
~erms of movements of the ~;4y Qr w1~h~n ;he~QQdlt I~~~~i~ 
therefore i~possible to state s~ffi~~~nt *p~p!~i9ns'tP'~~~S 
pf antecedept movements which·~~X v~tr ~pn~dm}~~~~~y w~~~ ~~~~ 
sequent movements (Peters, 1~5~~.~l~ .' . 
f ; t~ , 
P~ters th~refore argue~~. tl,ljlt ~~ij~~t ~p'~ 4~t..e~mi~i$tiC i"ium~pts t' 
, "" .. • • ts:· .... , • \1 
~ t ~. - : 
far f.Qm lending insight, f~nct~9n ta~he~ rq mr~f~fY h~~n *~iiQn '~~ 
. 'j, • ,',. ' • .,' , 
expla.in it thropgh redundanqrc~. Pirs~', c~~~~~."p~ d~t~rmin,i~t~~ Ci)~pl~ll~-
• ,~';1": I ~ ~,.. ~ 
~iQn is fupdamen~ally tuatologio~l: that W~ifn i~.~~~~ ~s. ~Y~4epQ~ at 
, . ~ :. ... _ .'. I • 
something is th~ll explained by tllflt .somet~ing ~ '" ~e~~:r1C:~.tY, q~~~~l ~i'plan.-
1 "':,'" .. f "';'. ~. ,. • _ , 
tion is mrstica+ in'that the alle8~4 causes 'of ~~~~v~or, w~e~~er ~hat bQ 
, ! 
demons, instincts, or needs, etc.;'are primarlly'derivates of the figment 
of a th~orist's inference. And lastly, causal or deterministic argument 
is fundamentally futile since all of the conditions can never be speci­
fied or controlled that would demonstrably permit observation of the 
effect of one variable on another. 
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The over-rid~ng point, however, and one that underlies the entire 
critique of causal explanation, is that in daily life individuals man­
age to comprehend and control their respective behavior, not via general 
theories-or causal explanations, but by ad hoc or situationally speci­
fied accounts. On th~ basis of motive-avowal behavior typically flows 
smoothly and finds justification within the contingencies of situations 
themselves. As such, ad hoc explanation in daily life is efficacious 
and germane. 
When we Ilaymen] offer explanations of human behavior, we are 
seeing that behavior as justified by the circumstances in which 
it occurs. In appealing to reasons for acting, motives, pur­
poses, intentions, desires, and the cognates, which occur in 
both ordinary and technical discussions of human doings, we 
exhibit an action in the light of circumstances that are taken 
to entitle or warrant a person to act as he does (Louch, 1969:­
4). 
II. DETERMINISM IN SYMBOLIC INTERACTIONISM 
In the realm of science, however, ad hoc explanations of,human 
behavior will not suffice. Indeed, the task of all behavioral science, 
including sociology, is an attempt to transcend the ad hoc and formulate 
generalization of human behavior within the parameters of a general 
philosophy of science. Specifically, sociology, in formulating theories 
of action, has been concerned with theories of behavior that not only 
theoretically generalize across situations, but also attempt to predict 
and explain behavior. It is because of this that 1aw~like> or determin­
istic theories of behavior have arisen. As Louch (1969:40) argues, with 
respect to ~ny philosophy of science, 
The test of explanation is its scope; the number of instances 
which can be seen to follow from it is a clear and objective 
way of assigning plus marks. To admit ad hoc explanations, on 
the other hand, is to allow instances of proper explanations 
which do not meet any particular- standard. 
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In addition to the problem of scope or g~nerality~ however, is the 
problem of prediction~ This involves what can be roughly coined as 
"variable analysis"; changes in specified variables are used to predict 
changes in other variable, thus involving a 'clear deterministic bias. 
Thus, as Blumer (1967:89) argues, 
The conventional procedure is to identify something which is pre­
sumed to operate on group life and treat it as an independent ' 
variable, and then to select some form of group activity as the 
dependent variable. The independent variable is put at the begin­
ning part of the process of interpretation and the dependent 
variable at the terminal part of the process. 
Needless to say, much of symbolic interactionism has not remained 
aloof from this practice; due to a reverence and preoccupatiqn toward'the 
canons of a respectable science, symbolic interactionists since Mead have 
developed a number of deterministic or law-like theories that generalize 
about the nature of human doings. This has been justified in a number of 
ways. Kuhn (1967:48-9) flatly argues that, "This internalization of 
. 
language and the concomitant internalization of the 
, 
role of the other has, 
in the Meadian description, nothing in it inconsistent with strict regu­
larity or determinism." Kuhn also footnotes Swanson (1961:327) as say­
ing, "Mead's account [of conduct] ••• is not opposed, in principle; to 
a deterministic view of behavior." However, Kuhn (1967:49) does recognize 
that Mead indicated that "the "I" is impulsive and essentially unpredict­
able--and furthermore that the "I" is the initiating, acting aspect of 
the self." But Kuhn (1967:49) excuses away these assertions so funda­
mental to Mead by arguing that Mead's arguments were "elusive" due to the 
fact that he orally presented his philosophy as opposed to writing it, 
and that therefore, "It is never completely clear whether he meant only 
that the I is subjectively unpredictable or that it is indeterminate in 
a scientific sense. rrS As was clearly argued above, Mead explained that 
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Soc refers to a social variable 
Self refers to a self variable 
Al refers to an immediate antecedent variaple 
A2 refers to an antecedent but distal var~aple 
C refers to consequent variable 
Beh. refers to behavior 
Solid arrow indicates a determinate causal process 
(Kuhn, 1967: 50) 
While it is not our intent (nor even a possibility within the' 
limited objectives of this essay) thoroughly to treat each theory with 
regard to its own idiosyncracies or persuasion, ~uhn's diagram will at 
least afford the basis of a general understanding and critique of deter~ 
ministic symbolic interactionism. 
Determinism enters symbolic interactionism through a very simple 
modification of Mead's basic premises concerning the relationship between 
the til'·! and the "Me." Specifically, instead of "taking the role of the 
7
other," the individual is seen to be "taken by the, role of the other .-It / 
This is accomplished by hypostatizing the "Me," and further engendering 
it with powers to manipulate and govern the response of the "I." In this 
sense the "Me" is made into an object or a collection of objects that in 
scientific verbiage can be referred to as an objective variable. As in 
role theory, the "Me" becomes a collection of objects such as expectations, 
norms, and rules that direct the response of the "I." Or~ in reference 
group theory, the "Me" becomes an object such as an organized collection 
of attitudes, values, mores, Jand folkways re~ative to a particular group 
that, as Shibutani (1967) says, acts as a "frame of reference" in direc­
ting the response of the "I." In early socialization theory the "self" 
was typically regarded as a function of "roles," or as Backman and "Secord 
(1968:289) say, "This linkage has for the most part taken the form of 




Now, however, "self theorists" have engender~d "self" as a more perma­
nent object that can be argued to determine its own role: 
The reverse of this fashioning of self by role may take two 
forms: role selection and role portrayal. In role selec­
tion, a person chooses roles that allow him to behave in a 
manner compatible with self; in role portrayal, when the role 
provides wide latitude for enactment, he favors the portrayal 
that is most consistent with self (Backman and Secord, 1968: 
~ 289) (emphasis in the original). 
As this latter example indicates, the variables or objects in 
deterministic logic are interchangeable and relatively arbitrary; selves 
can be a function of roles, or reference groups can be a function of 
selves. 
The remarkable flexibility' of such schemes is due to the fact that 
their logic is tautological. Again we can use some other studies by 
Backman and Secord (1961; 1965) to demonstrate this. Their.studies have 
been "guided by a social-psychological approach to personality, which 
assumes that stability and change in an individual's behavior over time 
is a function of stability or change in his relations with other persons" 
(Backman and Secord, 1968:289). But is not a relationship toward other 
people the way one behaves toward them? Through tautology, however, the 
"relationship" becomes a thing in itself, just as "roles,1t "reference 
groups," and "selves," become a thing in themselves. The logic proceeds 
as follows: a given behavior is used as evidence of another phenomenon 
or object which can be ~rbitrarily stated--norms, roles, selves, refer­
ence groups, sub-groups, whatever. This'object is then made into an 
independent variable and the original behavior is then argued to be its 
derivative. Douglas (1967:241) argues this same point except in ter~s 
of sociologica,l theories in general: 
38 

[TheQrists] assume that the observable phenomena are representa­

tive of .their theoretical categories. Such analyses of social 

phenomena really tell us nothing of a scientific nature: they 

consist primarily of merely imposing upon the immediately 

observable phenomena • . • an abstract set of assumptions about 

the nature of society, assumptions which can be applied any­

where to any social phenomena. 

The point is, though, that through tautology the independent and depend­
ent variable amount to one and the same thing~ except conceptually 
recast, divided, and hypostatized. In this sense deterministic theories 
in symbolic interactionism are "sustained not by evidence, but by the 
interdependence in meaning of the terms out of which • • • laws are 
formed" (Louch, 1969:14). Moreover, as Louch (1969:12-13) argues, 
We understand the verbiage of the superstructure a little better 

when we see what count as instances of his terms and rubrics. 

In this sense the theory has no explanatory power; and as a 

description is unnecessarily complex. 

The only significance of sociological tautologies is that of a "surprise 
[that] arises only in that what we know already about human activities 
can be re-phrased in this terminology and classificatory system" (Louch, 
81969:12). 
Deterministic theories in symbolic interactionism can therefore be 
seen as involving a strong mystical cast. Through tautology, norms, roles, 
selves, and other objects are argued ·to exist and in fact determine 
behavior. Yet, except for the actual behavior how can one observe norms, 
roles, selves, or frames of reference? One can not, for they are a 
product of theoretical abstraction and tautology. They are as real or 
unreal as the abstractions of mystics: demons, devils, and curses are 
equally unobservable. 
Th~s brings us back to Burke's notion of "perspective by incongruity." 
An individual's behavior can be.interpreted or translated in an infinite 
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yari~ty of causal arguments, primarily through the use of redescription 
and tautology. To suggest that a man's actions were determined by prior 
factors simply opens one's self up to "infinite regress" and speculation. 
Tautology is not the only discrediting feature of deterministic 
explanations in symbolic interactionism. In the process of redescribing 
behavior, tautology also conceptually ignores and obliterates features 
of behavior that do not fall within the confines of its focus. Specifi­
cally, in delineating the interaction between the dependent and independ­
ent variables, the intervening process drops out. What is left out is 
pr~cisely what Mead attempted theoretically to establish; namely, that 
meaning is processually contingent on the over-lapping and reciprocity 
of responses of individuals within behavioral situations. Let us look 
at the latter problem first, that of situations. 
In deterministic symbolic interactionism, situations are relatively 
unproblematic and inconsequential. The meaning of the behavioral inter­
action is seen to be contingent on antecedent, independent variables. 
What takes place is s'een to be casually dependent on that variable. Yet 
Mead maintained a constant posture toward recognizing the tentativeness 
of meaning 'Within situations. Responses are not necessarily forthcoming, 
or they can be inappropriate. Moreover, the situational environment can 
be inappropriate for a g~ven interaction, or invaded by others causing 
interruption or disclosu~e of secretly guarded information (see Blumer, 
1971)~ The point is that meaning is established in interaction, and 
interaction occurs in situations. A host of complexities is therefore 
situationally introduced. But as Strauss (1969:61) notes: 
A scientif~c vocabulary fashioned along the lines of "cues" or 
"stimulus response" or "the unconscious" or uneeds and drives" 
or merely "role-playing" and "status" and "self-conceptions" 
will tend to by-pass rather than handle its intricacies. 
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Deterministic'symbo1ic interactionism also miss'es :the cQmp1exiti~~ 
of action a~d meaning itself. As Kuhn's diagram indicates (p. 35), 
, , 
'behavior becomes ,unproblematic, a variable dependent on variously con­
ceiv'ed deterministic forces. But Mead was very mu~h opposed to this: 
responses are, always uncertain--the response called for,: by the "me" 
involves a moral, not mechanical, necessity. Action in this sense is 
problematic. As Strauss (1969:57) illustrates, "I can explode quickly, 
without reflection, at one ~f my own responses. I can dimly experience 
feelings about my performance without being clear what ,exactly I am ' 
experiencing." In short, therefore, behavioral meaning must be seen as 
fundamentally problematic, and a fu~l understanding of it requires a com­
prehension of the complexities and relevance of both sit~ations and 
actions. One can even go a step further and suggest that, in order to 
comprehend fully the complexities of meaning, explanation 'of behavior 
might better incorporate an "indeterminate" stance toward behavior. The 
point is, when can all the conditions and significant variables be stated 
that can explain the me~ing, of a given interaction? As Strauss (1969: 
33) notes, "The reappraisal of past acts and the appearance of surprise 
in present acts gives men indeterminate futures." 
III. THE CONCEPT OF EMERGENCE 
Without ardently rejecting the entire position of deterministic 
analysis, some notable symbolic interactionists have recognized its 
inappropriateness and inadequacy in conceptualizing the complexity of 
meaning in social interaction. Blumer (1969:2-3) in particular has con­
tinuously emphasi,zed the significance of both the "situation" and "actions" 
within the situation as key elements in ,the building up of social meaning: 
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I,.'l. 
Co~on to both of these fields [P7ychology and sog~p'logy] ~s . '. ,~~~;;J.f 
the tendency to treat human beh~v~or as the p:odu~!Y\of var~o1:l~~ r >:.~r~~e.~~~ 
factors tpat play upon human be~ngs; concern ~s w~tl1 the behav- :.,:.rl~<~f;~~"" 
ior and with the factors regarded as producing 1::he~~. • . ,,:.,¥~... 
[Th,us] in both such typical p~ycho1ogica1 and sociQ~ogica1 
. explanations the meani~gs of such things for the hdman beings 

who are acting are either bypassed or swallowed up ~n the fac­
tors used to account for their behavior. ' 

Bolton (1963:7) has coined the deterministic stance in sociology 
as a "Behavioral Science ideology" and has noted that it conveys an 
image of man as involving Ita mechanical response to or expression of 
some other activating force--that is, a reaction to stimuli, to organic 
tensions, to internalized norms, to social situations, to dysfunctional 
changes, etc." He sensitively notes that meaning in social acts "are 
constructional in character; they are built uE rather than being simply 
learned responses" (Bolton, 1963:104) (emphasis in the original). (Bolton 
(1963:8) argues that an appropriate image of man in sociology and' symbolic 
interactionism can be "neither than of a tbehaver' nor 'actor', but that 
of 'interactor'. ).BY viewing the basic individual unit as 'interactor' a 
connection is immediately made with two crucial sociological factors, 
situation and transaction." 
As opposed to strict deterministic models, Bolton therefore argues 
that the concept of "emergence ft is more appropriate for,conceptua1izing 
the building-up of meaning in terms of situations and actions. (Emergence 
tfrefers ·to the process in which the combination of elements having a 
given set of properties produces a new 'form having properties not charac~ 
teristic of any of the elements making it up'(Bo1ton, 1971:16). Obvious­
,ly, the concept of emergence is an attempt to get at the Uintervening 
proce~-;~s" of situation and action.) Th.e deterministic .notion that t'he 
meaning of behavior is located in antecedent or "before the fact" vari­
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ab1es is clearly rej ect'ed. As Bolton (1971: 2) argues, 
the outcome of the episode Is not predictable just from a know­
1edge--however ,comp1ete--of the personality, cultural, social 
structural, or other factors existing at the outset of .the 
episode, but that the outcome of the episode is also signifi­
,cantly shaped by the interpersonal and intrapersonal processes 
that occur during the episode. ' 
However, this is not to suggest that the proponents of emergence 
have given up on deterministic analysis; indeed, the very opp~site is 
the case. Proponents of emergence are still eager to affirm the basic 
ass~ptions of positive science in assuming that nature, including human 
behavior, functions according to naturalistic logic; "given the correct 
technique o~ the part of the practitioner, the 'invariable causality o£, 
the world can be made into one's bidding" (Burke, 1954:59). As Bolton 
(1971:3) explains, 
, But, though these latter processes are not to be und.erstood as 
mechanical manifestations of pre-existing structural and social­
ization, conditions, there is no implication that they are not 
explicable in naturalistic or deterministic terms--a1beit . . 
this natura1istic l exp1anation must partially lie in processes 
of emergence and creativity, both of which may be given ,an 
acceptable scientific grounding even though bo~h may defy pre­
.diction in advance. 
The special "technique" recommended for the deterministic analysis 
of emergent acts is tha:t of "rep1ication. 1I First, i~ is argued that, 
with respect to any emergent act, the relevant'conditions such as social 
structure, roles, situation, roles, etc. (the traditional sociological 
variables), that are involved prior to the act must be noted. Then, 
after an emergent episode one must further delineate all "the cond:ttions 
under which an emergence or creative act has occurred." Then it is 
argued that by replication a scientific prediction can be formulated of 
a similar creative event occurring under similar conditions"such as a 
scientific break-through, or parallel inventions. 
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Our retort, however, is that this is exactly the'2oint; after the 
f\ .. 
fact or retrospective explanations lie at the basis of m,an's comprehen­
sion of the sense ,and logic of his behavior. Indeed, this is Mead's 
point.* However, this is not to affirm that a given event or onets 
behavior follows naturalistic logic, but rather that the logic is a 
rationalization retroactively applied to the behavior. The technique 
of "replication" therefore merely beefs up the role of rationalization 
as explanation and dresses it in scientific verbiage. But like ration­
alization, itself, it has no explanatory power, but mere~y justificatory 
ability. The notion of "replicationH is a cleverly articulated concep­
tion of justification, not scientific explanation. ' 
Obviously this again introduces the relevance qf motives in human 
behavior. Motives are used to justify and rationalize questionable 
behavior. But they dO,not imply, nor can one infer, causal or determin-' 
istic sense in behavior on the basis of its rationalization. It has 
already been indicated why this is so. First, referring back to the 
technique of, "replication" involved in the notion of emergence, when can· 
all the conditions be specified? As Burke and Louch argued, they can not. 
Specification of necessary c~nditions can go on indef~nitely and it' 
involves infinite regression. As such, most theorists simply,stop at a 
convenient and'arbitrary point, and Uinte~ret this convenience as a 
cosmic reality" (Burke, 1954:231). 
As noted earlier, therefore, the relevance of motive falls within 
an indeterminate theory of human action. It is only because, as Mead 
*As quoted above: lilt is only after we have said the word we are 

saying that we 'recognize ourselves as the person that said it ••• ; it 

is only after we have done the thing that we are going to'do that we 

are aware of what we are doing" (Mead, 1934:203). 

44 
originally arg~ed, that actions and responses are continuously uncert~in 
and tentative, that motive-justifications become germane to behavior. 
What one frequently objectifies as the sense or logic of action is an 
imputation after the fact in the form of justification or rationalization. 
In this same reasoning, the meaning of actions is also tentative; in 
terms of the over-lapping and reciprocity of responses many ~ctions are 
not meaningful. As Mead (1934:142) illustrated, "We realize in everyday 
conduct and experience that an individual does not ,mean a great deal of 
what he is doing and saying. We frequently say that such an individual 
is not himself." And thus bespeaks the significance of rationalization. 
IV. BRIEF SUMMARY 
Louch argues that due to the sociologists' pre-occupation with 
methodology and proper scientific form, the study of human behavior has 
been led into redundancy and irrelevance. "It has led sociologists and 
psychologists to design their studies in accordance with some conception 
, /
of proper form and almost wholly without reference to the subject matter. 
In consequence the,putative laws are often thinly disguised tautologies" 
(Louch, 1969:9). Specifically, Louch (1969:1) argues that 
Behavioral scientists . . . and philosophers have put obstacles 
in the way of ad hoc explanations by demanding that any explana-' 
tion lean on generalities for its support. When these demands 
are taken seriously • . • theories are developed which meet the 
formal requisite of generality, but which pay the price for it 
rather heavily. For these ,theories are often redundant and 
,platitudinous or totally irrelevant to the behavior they are 

designed to explain. 

It is in this sense that motives have typically been construea. as 
involving underlying causes or forces that constJtute the "actual" or 
"intended" m~aning of an individual's behavior. However,. this is 
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obviQusly not the case. Motives are terms of interpret~tiQn th~t 
justify an individual's behavior by referring to one's, orientation with· 
in a given situation. As such, they are situationally' 'relevant, but 
hardly otherwise. But social scientists feel that "motive accounts 
seem defective because 'of their rough edges, their tentativeness" (Louch, 
1969:101). But this is because actions are themselves tentative. As 
Louch (1969:101) concludes, "There simply are cases i~ which the ascrip­
tion of motives is tentative and vague, not because our tools are inade~ 
quate, but because human action is often fundamentally ambiguous, often 
aimless, frequently equivocal." 
CHAPTER V 
C. WRIGHT MILLS' SOCIOLOGICAL IMAGINATION 
C. Wright Mills was not a champion of ad hoc explanations of social 
conduct either. Priding himself in taking a "class;i.cal" stance toward 
social phenomenon, or delineating ,that fine intersection between history, 
social structure, and individual biography, Mills consistently attempted 
theoretically to see the "Big Picture" (cf. Mills, 1959). Thus it should 
be of no surprise to find that, while his 1940 paper was the first expli­
cation of a truly sociological explanation of motives, Mills also argued 
tha,t motives, as lingual vocabularies, were aspects of larger social 
factors such as "social groups," "societal frames," and "historical 
'epochs." He also argued that motives were not merely' justifications ·or. 
descriptions of questioned behavior, but also functioned to "stabilize 
and guide behavior. and expectation of the reactions of others" (Mills, 
1962a:449)~ Thus he introduced a clear deterministic bias in terms of 
what he called the "soc'ial function" of motives. 
I. CONSEQUENTIAL SITUATIONS AND SURROGATES FOR ACTION 
Mills (1962a:440-l) correctly argues.that motives are justifica­
tions in situations where conduct is questioned: "For men live in 
immediate acts of experience and their attentions are directed outside 
themselves until acts are in $ome way frustrated. It is then that aware­
ness 'of self and of motive occur." Moreover, "the 'question' is a lingual 
index of such conditions" (Mills, 1962a:441). As such, motives do not 
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refer ,to anything "inti persons, but" "They stand for alfticipated ;3itua­
tio~a1 consequences of questioned conduct" (Mills, 1962a:441)~ 
As a word, a motive tends to be one which is to the actor and to 
the other members of a situation an unquestioned answer to ques~ 
tions concerning social and 1in~ua1 conduct. A stable ,motive is 
an ultimate in justificatory conversation (Mills, 1962a:443) 
(emphasis in the original). 
It should be remembered that by 1940, Mills' argument above repre­
sented the first explicit sociological analysis of motives, and that 
Mills was relying heavily on the works of Mead and Burke. But Mills 
also did more than merely sociologically integrate Burke with Mead. He 
argued that the significance of motives as merely justifications of 
questioned cond~ct was not to deny their efficacy and function in social 
behavior (see Gerth and Mills, 1953:116). Specifically" Mills' (1962a: 
441) argued that "individuals act in terms of anticipation of named con­
sequences" (emphasis in the original). And because motives are names of 
consequential situations, they are also "surrogates for actions leading 
to them" (Mills, 1962a:441). Mills argues that what this involves is that, 
in situations where a question is raised, motives act as an "integrative 
cue" to others with regard to their cooperation or involvement in the 
future completion of the situated actions. 
The societally sustained motive-surrogates of situations are both 
constraints and inducements . • . such words, often function as . 
directives and incentives by virtue of their being the judgements 
of others as anticipated by the actor (Mills, 1962a:445) (empha­
sis in the original). 
In this sense Mills is arguing that the social function of motives 
is that they integrate action toward others by justifying the present pro­
gram of action and also callout or induce 'reciprocating responses from. 
others. In this way" Mills (1962a:449) argues that "Vocabu1a~y of 
motives ordered to different situations stabilize and guide behavior· and 
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expectation of the reactions of others." 
In developing a sociological explication of motiv~s, Mills there­
fore takes a considerable step further than simply arguing that motives 
should be conceived of, not as causes, but justifications of behavior. 
First, Mills argues that the role of motives is not simply "after the 
fact" of a questioned act in terms of justifying it. But the avowed 
justification or motive is centrally influential as a "before the fact" 
phenomenon in terms of calling for a particular response from others, 
a~d stabilizing and guiding behaviors in the next act. Or as Mills 
(1962a:445) argues, motives function as "constraints and inducements 
directives and incentives lt for others and one's self in constructing the 
next act (emphasis in the original). 
But there is a conceptual problem here, if not a contradiction. 
Motives as "justifications" are "after the fact" with only problematic 
and unspecified significance toward later interaction. However, motives 
as "surrogates of action" that callout and guide responses from others 
·in building up following acts take on a deterministic or causal bias, 
a~most akin to the traditional notions of motives. Mills was aware of 
this determinism, however. He hypothesized that "typal vocabularies of 
motives for different situations are significant determinants of conduct 
(Mills, 1962a:445). He ~lso clearly stated that "Vocabularies of motives 
order to different situations stabilize and guide behavior and expecta­
tions 'of the reactions of others" (Mills,' 1962a:449). Moreover, it is 
absolutely essential to Mills' (1962a:444) argument that motives act as 
an' "integrative factor in future phases of the original social acti.on·or 
in other acts" .Cemphasfs in the original). 
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'But on what logical basis can one' argue that motives, even within 
'this ,lingual-sociological sense; can be said to infl~e~ce' or d~tel1I1i~e 
conduct? Only one', and that is ex post facta logic, pr rationalization 
"after the fact." This is for obvious reasons. Can the ~ature of a 
response, or even a response itself, be predicted or gU;:Lranteed "before 
the fact n on the basis of a motive avowed? No; h~an responses are 
always uncertain, tentative, and even surprising. All one can do is 
hypothesize that motives guide and stabilize conduct; their actual effect 
can only be ascertained by observing a given interaction wherein motives 
are avowed, and then "after the fact" argue that later events were influ-, 
enced by mo~ives themselves. Again, however, this logic is rationaliza­
tion. Furthermore, if one wants to hypothesize "causes" or determinants, 
one has an infinite number to choose from because this effort involves . 
infinite regression. 
The problem actually gets down to the question--.what is the social 
sign~ficance of motives? Mills begs this question by an ~priori or 
, "before the fact" assumption that motives function to integrate others 
into the social act by calling out responses in others, and thereby gU1d­
ing and stabilizing conduct. Mills here is attempting to use motives 
in a vein similar to that used by others concerning "rules" and "norms." 
It is explained that interaction flows smoothly because "rules" and 
"norms" or "roles" (or Umotives") guide and stabilize conduct. But the 
meaning of motives can only be ascertained by noting the way others· 
respond to them, and this is problematic across situations. Motives, as 
justifications, can be accepted, rejected, or ignored. Their meaning in 
action is determined by the way they are acted upon; thus ,their meaning 
is an on-going problem. Avowed motives do not guarantee particular 
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respon~es·. Like other theorists, Mills is too anxious to explain behav­
iort por instance, he e.ven argues tha.t motives are Ifunquestione~ :answers 
• ~. I 
I I.., 'I 
, !. 
to questions ~9ncerning $oQi~l and lingual conduct" (Mills~ 196.fa:443)" 
And in doing ~o he hegs the pr~blem,of behavioral meaniflg t :&ec~us(e th, 
meaning of any social "factor" is de~ived in terms of tJle response it 
receives, stat~ng the problem in r~v@;~e amounts to beggin~ t~~ ~yesrion 
v " :. f'4,,'" ',l. ." 
through tautol9gy. Put simply, the response is not due t~ ~fi~~~~~~~~g 
•" "'t-;: I ~' ." i.t ". 
of the motive; rather, the meaning of the mQtive 'i~ given bY··~h~l".t~~R~n~p~ 
.. .. I ~ .. t.... i 
Mills ar~ed that motives hay:e;.a, 4eterministic effect Q~" ~~n~r. ~ ~ . 
. ' .. ,"'" ~'''' . 
actions. Oth~f theorists have ~u~~cl 'over this problem, .n;t~bif ~'l'~n' . 
" ". 11 
Foote ~n 1951, and he argued that the relationship between wq~~~ ~n4 
action~ as outtined by Mills was somewhat "my~terio4~!" rq9~~ ~ll~~~fQFA 
. r·. '..~ 
" 
attempted to e~plicate the signific;mce of lllotive~ ~s rrpet~+~ 'J:n~ ~Q.C;~" 
phenQm~non. I~ doing so he reempha~i~e~ Mills' determinl~m,~n~ ~t~W~ 
the ta~tology ~o its natural cQPcl~sion. 
~ 
CHAPTER VI 
NELSON FOOTE ON IDENTIFICATION 
As Becker (1964a:llO) argued, motivation was no problem for Mills: 
, Motivation was thus no problem for Mills, and he used the famil­
iar concept of role as a superordinate performance category by 
means of which the individual is led on. Roles tell the indivi­
dual how to act for maximum self-satisfaction and facilitation 
of conduct. 
Moreover, as late as 1953 Mills was still subordinating the problem of 
motivation to an aspect of role theory. For instance, as Gerth and Mills 
(1953:11) argued: 
Man as a person is an historical creation, and can most readily 
be understood in terms of roles which he enacts and incorpo­
rates. . • . His memory, his sense of time and space, his per­
ception, his motives, his conception of self ... his psycho­
logical functions are shaped and steered by the specific con­
figuration' of roles which he incorpo~ates from his society. 
Foote also came to the problem of motivation via role theory. The 
first sentence of his paper is that "Role theory has suffered since incep­
tion from lack of a satisfactory account of motivation" (Foote, 1967:343). 
The deficiency of role theory, he argues~ is that, while it can explain 
"standard situations" adequately, it can not explain situations that 
involve role conflict, apathy, or abandonment. riA striking revelatio'n 
of the need for some theory of 'motivation .•• is disclosed by apathy 
in the performance of conventional roles, when these are on the verge of 
abandonment, or are accepted only under duress" (Foote, 1967:343). Foote 
(1967:353) therefore sets forth that "role theory needs to be supplemented 
with an account of motivation consistent with its main premises." He 
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cite's Mills as dealing with this problem) especially with, refe,rence to 
motives as justifications. But he criticizes Mills I 'paper because it 
leaves the reader with the uncomfortable feeling of an unana­
lyzed hiatus between words and acts, of mystery as to just how 
language does in fact motivate. It is this hiatus which the 
concept of identification seems adequate to fill (Foote, 1967: 
344). 
By "identification" Foote (1967:347) means "appropriation of and 
commitment to a p~rticular identity or series of identities. As a pro­
cess, ~t prQceeds by naming; its products are ever-evolving self-concep­
tions--with the emph~sis on the con--, that is, upon ratification by 
sig~ificant others.1t Foote argues that, in situations of role 'conflict 
~r abandonment, one can not know what to do unless one knows who he is. 
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tlMoreover, he must know who he is with considerable conviction and clarity~ 
if his behavior is to exhibit definiteness and force, which is to say, 
,degree of motivation" (Foote, 1967:346). 
Foote (1967: 345) then defines "motivation" as referring 
to the degree to which a human being, as a participant, in the 
ongoing social process in which he necessarily finds himself, 
defines a problematic situation as calling for performance of 
a particul,ar act, with more or less anticipated consummations 
and consequences, and thereby his organism releas~s the energy 
app'ropriate to performing it (emphasis in the original). 
However, identification underlies the' problem of motivation because, 
Foote argues, within any given situation, one can not know what is 
expected of him (or what the situation calls for) unless one knows onels 
identity. Says Foote (1967:350): 
Only full commitment to one's identity permits a full picture 
of motivation. Faith in one's conception of self is the key 
which unlocks the physiological resources of the human organism, 
releases the energy (or the capacity, as Dewey would say) to 
perform the indicated act. 
Thus identification is argued to be the basis of motivation. 
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One could argue here that Foote is merely arguing in 'circles: 
knowing what one is supposed to do is knowing what one is, and vice 
versa. To use one of Foote's examples j if one is expected to stand on 
"first base" and catch the ball before the "runner" touches the base, 
one knows not only what to do, but also who he is. He is the man who 
stands on first base and catches the ball before the runner touches the 
base. Furthermore, if one knows he is expected to do this for nine 
"innings," then he knows that he is conunitted to this identity for nine 
"innings." The relationship between identification and motivation as 
Foote sets it·up therefore seems to be quite pOintless. Foote also says. 
that both the processes of identification and motivation "release" the 
energy for the given act. But which process comes first and what their 
actual differences are remains quite obscure. 
However, Foote is trying to grapple with the' problem proposed'by 
Miller: how does one know what to do when situations are confusing and 
actions are questioned? Foote argues that this l in fact, is the problem 
of motivation. Now Mills argues that motives justify behavior by naming 
anticipated consequences of one's action with reference to other's ac- . 
tions. These justifications can then be said to represent "surrogates 
of action" that cue in or integrate others, and guide and stabilize 
future actions. Foote (1967 :'344) claims that this is still somewhat of 
a mystery because Mills does not tell us "just how langu~ge does in 'fact· 
.motivate." Thus the hiatus between words and acts. Foote therefore 
argues that, by fiat, motivation is the problem of the individual defi­
ning a situation as calling for a particular act (on the basis of find­
ing out who he is), "and thereby his organism releases the energy 
appropriate to performing it." Foote (1967:345) argUes along with Mills 
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that motives, as surrogates of action and names for consequential situa­
tions, function along with other cues n9t only to callout responses by 
organizing "acts in particular situations but (also] make them recog­
nizably recurrent in the life-history of any person or group." 
I • A SUPPLEMENT TO ROLE THEORY 
The way in which Foote sets up the problem of motivation it is, 
indeed, a supplement to role theory.9 By fiat, motivation is actually a 
problem of "role-identification" or "role appropriation." Defining a 
problematic situation as calling for a particular response is the process 
of identifying one's role. Identification of who you are and what one is 
supposed to do (which is the same thing!) is therefore the basis of moti­
vation. The significance of all this is that it makes, as in Mills' case, 
the problem of motivation a "before the fact" phenomenon. People are 
seen to act on the basis of identifying what the situation calls for, as 
indicated by various cues, such as motives, identities, etc. Or, action 
'is said to "be released" or to proceed after one has defined the meaning 
of a situation as calling for a particular response. As in Mills' case, 
action is therefore seen to be a result of the meaning of definition of 
the situation calling for a particular performance on the basis of various 
motive-cues. Only then is energy released. This is actually a typical 
account of action in symbolic interactionism. As Brissett (1971:6) . 
explains: 
The conventional notion in most symbolic interactionism has been 
that persons come to situations, define these situations, and then 
(and only then) act in these situations. The "definition of the 
situation" in this pOint is essentially mentalistic; i~ is an 
interpretation one makes of or upon his environment. Whether this 
interpretation be labeled "dynamic assessment, ,.. "definition of the 
situation, II or "creation of the obj ect world, II the defi,ning ele­
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ment functions the same. Men act after they have'~dentified and 
conceptualized their environment (emphasis added). 1 . 
In Footers case, as with most other forms of conventional symbolic 
interactionism, action is seen to be the result of either the meaning 
that one confers upon the situation, or the meaning of the situation as 
'it calls for a particular response as indicated by various cues such as 
motives, roles, etc. With respect to Foote one wonders whether the 
situation calls for a response, or one defines the situation as calling 
for a response. But in either case, action is said to tlbe released" and 
contingent on a "before the factlf phenomenon; namely, the meaning of the 
situation. As in role theory, action is contingent on the meaning of 
the role. 'Or in other forms of conventional symbolic interactionism~ 
action is contingent on the meaning of reference groups, or the self, or 
the social ~tructure--or however meaning.is hypostatized. 
10
In fact one can formulate the "Grand Theory of Motivation" in 
traditional symbolic interactionism: response is based on the meaning 
of the situation (also called the "definition'~ of the situation) as indi­
cated by vocabularies of motives, roles, identities, selves, reference 
ll groups, social structures, ad infinitum. But unfortunately, at the 
basis of this "Grand Theory of Motivation" is its own Achilles Heel-­
"The Grand Sociological Tautology.1t The creation of the sociological 
tautology goes as follows. A given situation is observed to involve a 
given meaning. This meaning is then hypostatically interpreted as a kind 
of existent object, say, a role, definition, or value, etc. (a number of 
arbitrary metaphors are used). Then this "object lt is used to explain the 
resultant actions of the individuals within the situation. But because 
the argument is circular or merely redescriptive, it has no explanatory 
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value. Specifically, action is not the result of the meaning or defini­
tion of the situation, but the situation derives its meaning from the 
response to it. And this is why philosophic logicians.~ike Louch (1969: 
9) bluntly say, and with good reason: tlTriviality, redundancy, and 
tautology are the epithets which I think can be properly applied to the 
behavioral scientist." 
II. THE HIA'I1JS 
The meaning of a vocabulary of motive, situation, role, self, 
reference group, and all other sociological variables, is created and 
established by the response to it. Even the significant symbol, as Mead 
(1934:84) consistently argued, is always dependent on "the context in 
terms of which, or as the field within which, significant gestures or 
symbols do in fact have significance." And meaning is determined by 
response. Thus by its very nature, meaning is an "after the fact" prob­
lem within an indeterminate field of action responses. Meaning involves, 
as Mead said, a moral necessity, but no mechanical necessity. 
Thus the hiatus between words and actions inevitably remains because 
the meaning of response is an "after the fact" problem that is always 
tentative. Response creates the meaning of language~ just as the "I" 
creates the meaning of "Me." But response is uncertain and proble~atic. 
Unfortunately because symbolic interactionists have been. so anxious to 
explain away the response, we have little idea of how problematic it is. 
But even within the daily events of everyone1s life there is cons~ant 
discrepancy between what one expects from others and one's. self, and what 
actually happens. And the significance of motives, as justifications,. is 
that they rationalize this discrepancy of action, but they dp not deter­
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ministica11y explain it. The significance of motives, as Lyman and 
Scott (1970:112) argue <is "its ability ~o throw bridges between the 
promised and the performed; its ability to repair the broken and restore 
the estranged." 
CHAPTER VII 
ERNEST BECKER'S CRITIQUE OF MILLS 
No theorist has conceptually focused on the hiatus between words 
and actions as vividly as Ernest Becker. In his analrsis of Mills' 
social psychology, it is failure on the'part of Mills to deal with this 
hiatus that amounts 'to Becker's most emphatic criticism. As Becker' 
(1964a: 118) explains: 
And in order to understand this phenomenon we have to pick up 
one historical current that was not elaborated in Mills' social 
,psychology. This permits us to evaluate Mills r social psychol­
ogy from still another point of view: that of phenomenology~ 
The main emphasis of phenomenology in social 'psychology is that 
meaning must b~ seen as an on-going accomplishment predicated on the 
behavior or action of t~e organism toward, its object-world. The emphasis 
is on the ability of the organism to act toward objects and therein cre­
ate a relationship with the object. Now this must'be emphasized since 
action toward obJects is not an automatic given built in to the human 
organism. Rather, the organism, through trial and error experimentation, 
develops the ability to act. In the human's case, the problem is even 
more complex since it is only humans that develop a reactive capacity 
toward symbolic objects (see Becker, 1962a). ' But phenomenologists 
ardently stress the independence between objects (including symbols) and 
actions. 
Becker notes that other theorists have depicted this hiatus as a 
mind-body dualism, or more appropriately stated, a dualism between sym­
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bolic thoughts versus action. There is a separation that is only ove~~ 
come, and then only partially, by the experience of the individual in 
acting. Says Becker (1964a:120): 
Now, this' self-body dualism, as we would expect, is not uniform 
in everyone. That is to say, some of us pay more attention to 
the external world, act in it more, test ourselves with the out­
side of our bodies. Others among us act less in the external 
world, shrink up more within themselves, feed ourselves on 
thought or fantasy, take refuge from the demands of the outside, 
expand our inner life, and nourish ourselves on it. 
The important point, however, is that "words mean little to the develop­
ment of our total personality unless we connect them up with some kind 
of lived experience" (Bec~er, 1964a:12l). 
Becker concludes that if Mills would have incorporated this 
phenomenological point of view in his social psychology, he would have 
realized that situated actions, far from being guided and controlled by . 
vocabularies of motive, are frequently made progressively more tentative 
and unpredictable, especially in complex urban environments. The prob­
lem for the individual is precisely in being able to control and initiate 
a response within problematic s~tuations (see Becker, 1964a:122). In 
this sense, Becker (1964b:23-4) is arguing that "meaning is won by behav­
. ior, not merely by registering experience." Thus for meaning to be 
established on any level or situation, "the organism must be able to call 
up a response to it" (Becker, 1964b:19). But human reactivity is not 
automatic; rather it is problematic. Mills and Foote failed to emphasize 
this in their social psychology because response was largely begged and 
explained away. Moreover, theorists in general have been so used to 
explaining away the complexities of bodily responses' as being remotely 
controlled or directed by roles, norms , motives', sym~ols, and other 
social "forces" that the problematics of action have been largely 
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ignored.* But as Becker (1964b:15) argues, "Behavip~J'energy-conversion 
are primary. Symbols (and othe~ social fac~Qrsl ~re gadflies that edge 
the organism on, but it is the organism that edges. 't Moreover, it is 
the organism that, if capable, uses the social ·"object. 1t For instance, 
a~ Becker (1964b:lS) argues: 
symbols enter in only to facilitate and enrich the process. 

[but] it is the organism that uses the symbol, that must tend 

. away from or toward the object signaled. The organism tends, 

moves, recoils; the symbol is merely a counter. 

I. THE HIATUS, PAR EXCELLENCE 
But some individuals are more gifted in acting than others. In 
-the construction of meaningful actions some individuals are more capable 
o~ using symbols, motives, norms, and roles. But no one is "used by". 
symbols, motives, norms, etc.; no one is "taken by the role of the otl1er." 
Meaning is contingent on the individual's ability to act, but there is no 
guarantee how effective in any situation the individual is going to be. 
There is a hiatus between what words or situations call.for, and recipro­
eating action. As Becker (1962b:496) illustrates, "The simple act of 
engaging someone by offering him a seat is fraught with possibilities 
of bungling." And this "bungling" is a matter of .no small significance. 
The hiatus, 'par excellence, between words and actiohs is schizo­
phrenia. The problom of schizophrenia, as Becker (1964b:52) nrgue~ is 
that "words are not fused to organismic meanings." The problem, above 
all, is ineptitude in acting, in initiat~ng a response toward symbolic 
objects. While this is a very complex problem the- general features of 
*Dennis Wrong's (1970:38) advice might be germane here: "I think 






schiz'ophrenia is that "the~e seems to exist a real possibility of a 
spl~t between mere apprehension and t~~e experience of meanin~~~ (Bec~~;, 
, 1L . 
1964b:52). I~ is in this sense that the schizophrenic maYQ~:i~are Qf 
\'. ' 
symbotl.ic obj ec~s "but no corresponding firm and broad range Qf ~ntor"I 
. I 
personal behaviors" (Becker, 1964b:~~2). Thus the schizophre~i~ is 
characterized frequently as possessing a complex ~n4 eve~ f~~+:~~~ing 
~ " :: .' " 
"voeabulary" ap to his experience, but an inepti;u<.i, in belt~Y~~~~t+Y 
transacting with others or the object-worlq. 
purthermpre, theorists do no~ ~now at th~s time ~ow cq~B~~~P~P In 
acting becomes engendered in people. As Becker (1964b: 2Q) pay& I "w,p 
have o~ly the vaguest, most gen~ral notions on how exper~en~e ~$ p'q4l~ 
;nt.o the organ;ism." We ~o know ~h~t~ with children, mfl,terllf+l tgy~ tnUI 
'" I t 
~ ~Qrr~sponding "feeling" of high $ellSe of worth is ~e~1it~+ fQr t~~ '. 
. .~ 
fhi+~ to begin behaviorally to wanipulate his objec~~~q~fd. ~~t ;hp
• t'... .. '1" '" 
+ons, Q~qavioral trans~tion fro~ cq114hood to adulth~Q~ i~ cqm~i~~ ~n~, . 
" , 
yet, ~qu~lly i~po+tant in terms pi tne development of ~ ~pm~~;'en; h~~nt 
, ' f 
In t~rms Qf schi~Qphrenia, the hiatus between word~ lnd ~~~~Q~~ 
~I~: ~~ ~ 
has be~n depicted by {..~i~g as a person being "embodied," Qr !~\t~:JllR~4~p~.!~ 
. 
f;The em90died person, says ~aing (1$60:67-70), t, 
has a sense of being flesh and blood and QP~Cs, of being bi~logi­
cally alive and real; he knows himse+f to be $ub,:S.tantial. Tq. 
the extent that he is thoroughly "in" hi~ b!=l4y, ,he is likely lq . 
have a sense of personal continuity in time.. .:' ", 
The scllizophrenic, on the' other hand, does not expetien~e '. his body as ~ll$l 
",;;;'t'\_u 
center of his own causality. His responses to situations' are confused" , 
disjointed. Laing therefore characterizes this hiatus between words an4 




This may be a clue to one aspect of the puzzling phenomenon of" 

"schizophrenic language." When words no longer refer to poten-. 

tial organismic action, or to any felt organismic involvement, 

they lose their quality as true language. Dewey'S observation 

is apt: he calls this split between word sound and organismic 

quality a Itshortcircuiting." 

I I. THE HIATUS AS EVERYONE'S PROBLEM 
As Mead (1~34:147) said, "There is, of course, a great deal in 
one's conversation with others that does not arouse in one's self the 
same response it arouses in others." Moreover, as Mead also indicated, 
there is a great deal in conversation with one's self that does not 
receive a response that was anticipated. Responses are always uncertain. 
There is a hiatus, then, that is an integral feature of human behavior 
itself. It .lies between one's self and one's actions, or between what 
we expect ourselves to do, and what in fact we actually do. Thus in each 
social situation this discrepancy is always a latent possibility, Each 
situation can involve the potentiality of discrediting the prized image 
of the self. Thus Becker (1964b:69) argues, 
If one act can undermine a self, and one social role fragment it, 
then it can have no duration except in fantasy. But let me 
stress that this applies not to the schizophrenic only_ This is 
the anxiety of every social actor. "I am nothing if each situa­
:tion can construc~ me anew." 
Managing situational inconsistency and confusion, then, is an absolute 
necessity in maintaining tlself" in social interaction. "Questions" arise 
in conduct frequently because individuals say or think one thing and yet 
do another. ttNature, on the other hand, seems blissfully unconcerned with 
anything except keeping action moving forward, proceeding from one·situa­
tion to the next ll (Becker, ,1964b:70). T~e sense of continuity and perma­
nence of one's self therefore becomes largely a product of one's ability 
63· . 
to rationalize th.e discrepancy. into an acceptable acc::ord ~Q other!l. O+'; 
as Becker (1964b: 70) 'says) "rhus every ~ndividual is pbliged to 'creatQ 
the cause-and-effect myth of his own past." And this) of coufse, i~tr~­
duces the significance of motive-rationalizations of the discrepancies 
in social interaction. Motives'function to justify "questioned" behav­
ior to significant others. They function to bridge the hiatus between 
what words or situations call for and what actually occurs. 
CHAPTER VIII 
MOTIVES AS DRAMATURGICAL PROBLEMS 
A motive, as we have seen, is a justificatory r~ason in interac­
tional contexts where behavior is being judged by significant others. 
It refers to a directed disposition toward a goal relative to one's 
orientation in a situation that explains the reason for the action. As 
such, motives introduce the problem of "drama" into human conduct, or 
'the attempt by individuals to dramatize, through justification, their 
purposes and intentions. The critical variable of these dramatic 
appeals is, of course, the social audience from where questions toward 
one's behavior are first initiated. As Burke (1954:274) said: 
Human conduct, being in the realm of action and end (as con­
trasted with the physicist's realm of motion and position) is 
most directly discussable in dramatistic terms. By "drama­
tistic" terms are meant those that begin in theories of action 
rather than in theories of knowledge (emphasis in the original). 
Action is therefore the key variable underlying the construction 
of social meaning; meaning is n~t understood as a symbolic construct, a 
body of knowledge, or definitions that determine, in some sense, the 
significance of actions. As a theory of action, then, motives refer to 
dramatic appeals to significant others for justification of one's actions. 
Motives are therefore types of actions themselves. In this sense, 
motives, as dramaturgical actions, can be categorized into two types: 
discursive and apparent. "Discursive motives are those which are trans­
mitted verbally, and apparent motives are those which are communicated 
by the appearat;lce of the part1es involved" (Edgley, 1971a:10). Oh~iously, 
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one can justify one's conduct frequently through appearance only by, as 
in the case of a policeman, simply showing a badge or a seafc4 warrant., 
Even "appearing" within particular settings or situations can convey 
one's motives (see Stone, 1970 and Lyman and Scott, 1967). The mere 
presentation of self can convey motives, but yet, if further questioning 
is involved, one can resort to verbal justifications. The point is that 
one can not only give motives, but also give off motives (see Goffman, 
1959). 
,This is not to suggest, however, that dramatistic appeals auto­
matically work. Unsympathetic audiences, as Goffman (1959:51) critically 
notes, have a frequent "tendency to pounce on trifling flaws as a sign 
ttthan the whole show is false • • The significance or meaning of 
mo~ives is also contingent on the problematic responses of'others. 
Untoward or questionable behavior can be "normalized" through motive 
avowal, or the motive can be rejected and the audience thereby react 
toward the individual in unanticipated ways.12 Yarrow and Schwartz, et 
al. (1955) have even studied the phenomenon of untoward behavior becoming 
normalized, not through motive-avowal, but through blunt denial on, the 
part of the audience that anything unusual is happening. Audiences' can 
clearly be either sympathetic, apathetic, or without mercy. Following 
this same logic, the question of whether a motive is "real" or not can 
therefore be determined on the basis of whether the motive is accepted 
or tolerated by the audience (Edgley, 1971b). "Unreal" motives are 
13
simply those that the audience will not accept.
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I. STIGMA AS EVERYONE'S PROBLEM 
Understanding' that the response of the audience is the contingen~ 

variable that determines whether a motive is accepted a~ "rea~" or not 

introduces the whole realization that being discredited and stigmatized 

- is everyone's problem in all situations. As Howard Becker (1963:9) 
argu,es, meaning' is not inherent in any particular ,behavior such as, say, 
a deviant act, but is "rather a consequence of the application by others 
of rules and sanctions to an 'offender'." The meaning of a given per­
~on 's -behavior, even if justified by an avowed motive, is' determin'ed' by 
the consequence of the response of others. Thus, ,in all situations 
there is the latent possibility that inadvertent acts and discrepancies 
made by the individual can be used by an audience to discredit him. 
And, as Goffman (1959:51) describes, "even sympathetic audiences can be 
momentarily disturbed, shocked, and weakened in their faith by the dis­
covery of a picayune discrepancy in the impressions presented to them." 
Moreover, as Goffman (1963:127) further indicates: 
The most fortunate of normals is likely to have his half-hidden 
failing, and for every little failing there is a social occa­
sion when it will 100m large, creating a shameful gap between 
virtual and actual social identity. Therefore the occasionally 
precarious and the constantly precarious form a single continu­
um, their situation in life analyzable by the same framework. 
Stigma, therefore, should be understood as a general feature of all 
societal situations. ItThe normal and the stigmatized,are not persons but 
rather perspectives. These are generated in social situations during 
mixed contacts by virtue of the unrealized norms that are likely to play 
upon the en~ounter" (Goffman, 1963:138).14 
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II. MOTIVES AS PROBLEMS INVOLVING CONSEQUENCES 
Motives do not involve" nor do th~y infer "causes" or "determi­
nants" of actions. Rather" their social significance involves conse­
quences, or how particular acts, including motive-avowals, are responded 
to by others. This underlies the problem of "meaning" in general. Mean­
ing is on-goingly a problem of the future. Thus in terms of the meaning 
of motive-justifications, it is not, as Brissett (1971:12) argues, "as 
much a matter of something believed to be true being true in its conse­
quences (a traditional notion in symbolic interactionism); rather, that 
something believed to be true is true only in its consequences" (empha­
sis in the original). 
Within the ~ramaturgical theory of action (as motives have been 
shown to be a part), "cause" is a moot and silent problem. If the prob­
lem of "cause" is addressed at all, theorists simply say that any given 
action involves an endless variety of social, cultural, psychological, . 
and physiological variables (see Lemert, 1967). As such, if one ~ants 
causally to explain action, theories of imitation, conditioned-response, 
instincts, or drives" etc.--all of these theories may have relevance, 
but they only amount to relatively arbitrary and partial explanations 
at best. 
It can be sa~d, therefore, that the significance of motive~ 
justifications falls within an indeterminate theory of action. The empha­
lS
sis is on the problematics of action, its vOlatability and change. 
Thus" as Strauss (1959:43) argues, Itit is not ~hange that needs to be 
explained but its specific directions; and it is not lack of change that 
needs to be taken into account, but change itself." In this respect the 
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concept of "emergence" is germane (se~'p. 42). Bl.l.t the ability, "after 
the fact" on the basis of replication, ~o natU'ralistic~llr or determini~-
tically explain the episode is 1ar~e1r +ejected. First,'all of the 
cpnditions~-physiologica1, psychological, sociological, cultura1--can 
never be completely specified. Moreover, r~plication is ~imp1y a prob­
lem of redescriptive rationalization. Thus its explanation is merely 
tautological. Lastly, replication as rationalization simply returns us /' 
to the problem at hand, the function in human action of rationalization 
in general. But the significance of rationalization is not a problem of 
involving the "real" explanation; the significance is whether it is 
accepted by others. Its critical importance is therefore centered around 
the problem of consequences. Or, how does a given social audience 
respond to an avowed motive or explanation, and for what reasons does a 
given audience accept one rationalization over another? As was discussed 
earlier, individuals can utilize and avow an innumerable number of re1a­
tively arbitrary motive-rationalizations or explanations to justify 
behavior in varying social contexts. Furthermore, the substance of an 
avowed rationalization or explanation is not, in and of itself, the 
important consideration, but the impact and influence the rationalization 
will have on the given audience. In this respect an individual can 
attempt to provide a rationalization for behavior that best satisfies the 
needs, interests, and assumptions of the social audience, and thereby 
maximize the probability of his success in·negotiating the outcome of the 
social interaction. The key is the ability to match up an avowed ration­
alization with the expec~ations of the audience. Or, as Lyman and Scott 
(1970:125) have offered: 

In interacting with others, the socialized person learns a reper­

toire of background expe~tancies that are appropriate for a 
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variety of others. Hence the "normal" individual will change his 
account Ior rationalization] for different role others •••• 
Both the account offered by ego and the honoring or non-honoring 
of the account on the part of al~er will ultimately depend on 
the background expectancies of the interactants. By background 
expectancies we refer to those sets of taken-for-granted ideas 
that permit the interactants to interpret remarks as accounts 
in the first place (emphasis in the original). - ­
Actually, the term "background expectancies" is a "catch-all" term 
for a complex assortment of different kinds of criteria that audiences 
ut~lize to judge th~ worth of a motive-avowal, depending on the situa­
tion. For instance, a patient in psychoanalysis will typically expl~in 
-or rationalize his behavior in'a particular vocabulary-involving, certain 
assumptions ~hat are common to him, yet unacceptable to the psychoana­
lyst. This does not mean, however, that the patient's account is 
erroneous, for indeed in another circumstance it may be quite acceptable. 
But in this particular circumstance it is not unusual for a therapist' to 
insist that the patient redress his account in a vocabu~ary and set of 
assumptions that compliments the authoritarian status and ideology of 
the professional. In fact, some argue that therapy can not progress in 
psychoanalysis until the patient reformulates his account into the 
vocabulary of the doctor (cf. Burke, 1954). In a particular situation, 
then, the significant background expectancies may involve only ideologi­
calor philosophic assumptions. In other situations they may involve 
considerably more. 
Whether an account is honored or not may rest not on the criteria 
of philosophic assumptions, but more basic factors such as the political, 
social, and economic interests of the audience. For instance, many a 
conscientious objector has endured either long jail sentences or perma­
nent exile not because their motives were necessarily insincere, but 
70 
because the State interpreted their noncompliance as ~ithe+ due to 
"other" motive-s or that their behaviQr represented a flt~eat to tl1q . 
State's privilege and authority to tnduct men into mit~ta+y se~viqe, 
Another highly different example is the phenomenon of "symbolic crq." 
sades" where a larger party, due to a perceived threat to its status 
and prestige (as well as economic and political interests) sponsors the 
idea that another less powerful group harbors evil or dangerous motives 
against them and should therefore be treated either punitively or as an 
enemy (Gusfield, 1963). These examples, and of course many others, 
stand to illustrate that in the negotiation of motive-rationalizations, 
the interaction should not only be understood as a "drama" of one party 
appealing or accusing another party, but indeed, a political drama where 
the legitimacy of one individual's plea is judged by other's in terms of 
the latter's own interests of status, power, and ip,eology. These are 
some of the important factors that are involved in the broad notion of 
"background expectancies." 
III. THE SOCIOLOGY OF MOTIVATION 
The analysis of motivation, as found implicitly in ,Mead and expli­
citly in Burke, is only amenable to a sociological theory in so far as 
that theory maintains a consistent stance toward the nature of social 
'meaning. Specifically, meaning can not be reified into impersonal objects 
that in some way determine the flow of behavior. Rather, meaning must.be 
seen as on-goingly established by behavior and reciprocating responses. 
The significance of motives becomes relevant at this point because they 
function to justify behavior that is frequently meaningless and ambiguous. 
Indeed, it seems hard to imagine the relevance of motives at all if social 
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meaning was constant and all-perva~ive as depicted in traditional socio­
logical ~etaphors. (Possibly this is why most traditional symbolic 
interactionists have ha~ little to say about motives.) 
In this sense, a sociological understanding of motives amounts to 
only one aspect of a larger theory of social action, namely dramaturgy. 
The entire emphasis of drama~urgy is to describe the intracacies and. 
processes through which meaning becomes established. Thus it repels 
~neories of human behavior that explain action in terms of metaphors . 
th~t largely exclude the significance of human behavior itself. Drama­
turgists share Blumer's (1969:66) understanding "that human interaction 
is a positive shaping process in its own right. The participants in it 
have to build up their respective lines of co~duct by constant interpf~­
tation of eac4 other's ongoing lines of action." The proble~ of mOltv~a 
becomes germa~~ here because meaning is problematic and actign f~equent+r 
n~eds some fo~m of justification. 
In general~ the significance of a sociological theory of motiva~ion . 
belongs to a l~rger theory of action that resists int~rrreting benaviof 
on the basis of anything other than behavior itself. Sreci~tcallYI tho 
relevance of ~dtives lies in observing and describing tre way in which 
people interpr~t their own behavior, and thus keep actipn IDQvlna. Th~ 
analytic emphasis is to understand how people themselve~ on-goingly 
, 	 establish and justify their reality; not in substituting through metaphor 
the meaning of action into another justificatory explanation or rationali­
zation. This is simply to say that a soc,iology of motivation is not 
relevant to any "perspectives by incongruity." We need to understand how 
people interpret their own behavior, not how remote theorists can inter­
pret it through an infinite number of metaphors '. 
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A sociology of motivation as outlined herein involves an apprecia­
tion of man as an artisan of his own art, an actor. of his own dramas. 
Motives are dram~tic appeals to audiences, and their signific~nce 
involves consequences of other's actions toward self. Theoretically, 
what is needed therefore is a cogent description of human doings, a 
description of the forms and styles of actual human interaction. But 
the endless redescription' of human actions on the basis of metaphor or 
tautology simply makes it less "real" and insightful. A description 
of human interaction considered dramatistically involves very much the 
same technique as that of the art critic in general: 
The aim of all commentary on art now should be to make works of 
art--and, by analogy, our own experience--more, rather than less, 
real to us. The function of criticism should be to show how it 
is what it is, even that it is what it is, rather than to show 
what it means (Sontag, 1961:23) (emphasis in the original). 
Men int~rpret their own actions, and build their own situations 
accordingly. ·A truly servicable science would therefore attempt to put 
men back in the role of being critics unto themselves. By doing so, a 
science would emphasize how man on-goingly constructs his world, and 
thus not how he is constructed by it. The task is to assist man in 
hearing, seeing, and feeling more of the consequences of his own actions. 
Or, as Sontag (1961:23) argues, "What is important now is to recover our 
senses. We must learn to ~more, to hear more, and to feel more" 
(emphasis in the original). 
CHAPTER IX 
CONCLUSION 
The image of man conveyed by Mead's social behaviorism is that he 
is an active creature by nature. As Desmonde (1970:57) argues: 
Mead also rejected the notion that [human] organisms passively 
respond to stimuli. He contended that the organism dynamically 
selected its stimuli; it does not react to perception. The 
organism to a great extent determines its environment., '••• 
Mead thus [regarded] the organism as a dynamic, forceful agent 
molding the world around it, rather than existing as a mute 
receptacle for stimuli which are later associated. 
In this same respect it has been argued that action is not the 
result of roles, norms, selves, or motives. Rather, men use ,roles, 
norms, and motives as aids in building up our own actions. Motives in 
particular are rationalizations the men use to justify the discrepancies 
in situated actions. 
This understanding lends crucial insight even into the nature of 
larger organizations and structures. Men use organizations and develop 
a complex "under-life" to the structure itself, as Goffman (1961) has 
described so well. Similarly, even "lower participants" in complex 
.organization creatively develop positions or power and status that 
incredibly determi~es the structure and functioning of the ~rga~izatio~ 
(see Mechanic, 1968). Moreover, modern organization and system theoris~s 
are becoming cognizant of the need for a more viable social psychology. 
As Buckley (1967:145) argues, as a more dynami~ social psychology is 
embraced, "organizational behav'ior takes 011 a'processual character of 
creation and recreation of meanings and expectations i~ a succession of 
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situations that are only partially or not at all regularized and stand­
ard~zed.n Buc~ley (1967:105) therefqre argues that moder~ system theo­
rists 
r~pres~nt an attempt at a rather complete overhaul of cont~mpo­
rary consensus theory by a return to social psychologi9al pasics 
and a reb~~lding, from the grou~d up, of'a balanced and dYn~~ic , 
conceptio~ of complex social organization. ' 
Put simply, a viable system model mUit contain a Vi~~~, ~~,t~t ~~~~n~t~ 
11. ogy, and each cj imens ion of the model must be cRf,gruent"with ": ~D~",,,~!:ij~f I 
• , •• ~ < ~ ','-i :'. , ~ 




':1'.",: \. .:. J ,.: .. 
The illu~trious metaphors of t~adit~op'a~ sociology an4 ~P9~~t 
~ " '. t ~I; '" ~. ./' :. T ~ • 
rsychology--so~ial structures, orgapi~~tions, ~~atus~~, role~i ~q;m-~. 
.. , 
se~ves~-these metaphors have impuded p~ witq a co~cep'~io~ ~f ~~c~~l tn~~'~ 
act~op as bein~ inhereptly orde;e~ ~n4 sensible. '~ut the mqre ~P' +~ 
1 
able tQ break l~rough these concept¥al illusions, the mor~ one f~ ~PtF ,~ 
a~~ gre~t disc~epancy ~nd confusion, npt only i~ action, but in soC~tt 
.. '"\ 
Qrianization. The "sQcial order" tllat we have been so used to aff~,::rm~n' 
is ~pe+@fore mQre pro~ressively s~~p is a product of ~~ own ration~t+l.ijY 
tion an~ justif~~~torr powers. iiowev~T, there is a dlscrepancy betweon 
. ~ . .... . . 
O,ur wpr~~ and Q~r actiQn$.. But ?ntil one pegins accur~~ely to de~~r~~p , 
actio~J one wil~ neve.r knQw th~ present $tate of order o~ d~~~tder ~~ 
society, It ha~ been ~rgue4 that conceptualizi~g human action ~~~ ~~tiy~~ 
• . i 




1. 	 Herbert Blumer (1969) was the first to label Mead's social behavior­
ism as "symbolic interactionism." 
2. 	 Psychologists have so thoroughly confused the notions of cause and 
motive that possible distinction between the two is probably not even 
within the realm of possibilities in that discipline: see, for 
example, R. W. White (1959) and a recent book considered a landmark 
in psychology by Cofer and Appley (1964). 
3. 	 It should be emphasized at this point that the terms "action," "mean­
ingful action," and "behavior" are at times used interchangeably. 
However, all of these terms are meant to imply or refer to the con­
struction of meaning in interactional terms; i.e., the problem of 
individual actors fitting together and building up their lines of 
action co-jointly. Moreover, this qualification extends to include 
those references to the analysis of the actions of an individual 
actor; i.e., the dialogue between the "I" and the "Me" must be under­
stood as a problem of interaction. A further explication of these 
assertions is given in Chapter One, sub-section "Action." 
4~ 	 It should be parenthetically acknowledged that the interpretation in 
this essay of Mead's analysis of meaning is only one of several vary­
ing interpretations. The variance is largely due, I would argue, to 
an inherent circularity in Mead's analysis in that, depending on 
where the emphasis lies, meaning can be interpreted as either a 
shared, symbolic phenomenon between groups of individuals, or an 
interactional phenomenon that i~ on-goingly created and built up in 
behavior. 
For instance, ~wo extreme kinds of interpretations will be demon­
strated. "If meaning is established only when the response elicited 
by the symbol is the same for the one that elicits the symbols as 
well as for the one who acknowledges it, then the interpretation 
logically leans toward an understanding of meaning as being a sym­
bolically shared, cognitive phenomenon between people. In this 
respect theorists then envision the human organism as becoming " 
"funded" with socially shared meanings through such processes as " 
socialization, education, inculcation of culture, and acquisition of 
language. )t also lends an. analysis ·to the problem of "universality , " 
which Mead (1934:99) explained as 
gestures or symbols that have the same or common meanings for 
all members of the group, whether they make them or address 
them to other individuals, or whether they overtly respond to 
them as made or addressed to them by other individuals. 
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On the other hand, if meaning is established only When the response 
elicited by the symbol is the same for the one that elicits the 
symbol as well as for the one who acknowledges it# then tpe interpre~ 
tation of meaning shifts from a symbolic; cogni~ive phe~qmenon to a 
behavioral, interactional phenomenon that is on-goingly sustained by 
the nat~re of responses toward objects and other individuals. Far, 
from becoming "universal, H meaning becomes interpreted as a situa- . 
tional creation that is fundamentally problematic and achieved only 
on the basis of on-going interaction. Also, this interpretation is 
not to be understood as 'excluding or negating the possible role of 
consciousness and awareness with respect to the nature of meaning. 
Rather~ instead of assuming, as does the former interpretation; that. 
interaction is continuously governed by rational and cognitive pro­
cesses "in" the respective actors, the thrust of the second interpre­
tation.is that men can become conscious and are capable of rational­
izing their actions. In this sense it is assumed that, "Only 
when . activity is interrupted does man become conscious of him­
self and then in a rationalizing manner" (Brissett, 1971:12). 
As the section on Mead already indicates, this essay emphasizes the 
latter interpretation of the nature of meaning although it does 
acknowledge that other interpretations offer theoretical utility, 
depending on the theorist's purposes. However, it is argued ,above 
that, with respect to the problem of motivation, the former interpr~­
tation typically involves assumptions about human behavior that are 
grossly over-socialized and mechanistic. It is around these issues, 
in fact, that a critique of the former interpretation of meaning is 
formulated. A reccnceptualization of the problem of motivation is 
then offered based on the interpretation that meaning is an o~-going 
creation of the activities of social interactants. 
5.. 	 There is a very interesting contradiction here. Kuhn (1,967:47) first 
notes that the oral tradition emphasized a "strain" to 'get it right', 
that is, to be correct." Yet later he argues that one can interpret 
Mead loo,sely because of the "elusive" nature of the oral tradition. 
Kuhn (1967:48) argues that numerous sub-theories stem from the 
essential ambiguities of Mead's position, 
ambiguities and contradictions which were generally interpreted 
to be dark, inscrutable complexities too difficult to under­
stand as long as the orientation remained largely in the oral 
tradition. 
6,. 	 By "indeterminance," Kuhn (1967) is referring to theories that avoid 
explanations of human action in terms of antecedent and consequent 
variables. I~determinate theories are fundamentally.descriptive in' 
nature. They analyze the way in which interactants attempt to fit 
their respective lines of action together, an~ thereby build up and 
sustain meaning in situations. The theorist thus avoids the tendency 
to imagine, in some way, specific variables that determine meaning in 
situations. All references to indeterminate theories in this essay 
will follow Kuhn's distinctions. 
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7. 	 See especially Mills' (1962b:426-3l) formufation of Meaq's Symbolic 

interactionism that represents a highly deterministic model of role 

theory especially designed for a sociplogy of knowle~ge. 

8.. 	It ~an be further argued that this use of tautological e~planation by 

traditional symboli~ interactionists, as well as sociologists in gen­

eral, is the underlying source of sociological "reification." Berger 

and Luckman (1966:89) explain: 

Reification is the apprehension of human phenomena as if they 
were things, that is,. non-human or possibly supra-human terms. 
Another way of saying this is that reification is the appre~ . 
hension of the products of human activity as if they were some­
. thing ~lse than human products .•• (emphasis in the origina~). 
Dramaturgists clearly see that the meaning of man's social world is on­
goingly constructed on the basis of his actions. toward social objects. 
But most symbolic interactionism and sociology explain behavior as a 
result of the me.aning of these social obj,ects. Thus "definitions of 
the situa·tion, It "roles, II "norms, II "reference groups, tt etc., become 
reified social objects that are used to explain resultant behaviors. 
Reification is therefore a product of tautOlogy: on-going behavior, 
which is used as evidence of something like norms,roles, becomes con­
ceptualized into an object which is then used to explain the original 
behavior. This has indeed been the traditional, theoretical fate of 
motives. As products of tautology, motives were seen to be not only 
indicated by behavior, but were also used causally to explain it. 
Thus, in considering the significance of motives, norms, and roles, 
if the theorist fails to stay close to Mead's understanding that mean­
ing is an on-going product of behavioral response, his explanation is 
doomed to mysticism on the basis of tautology and reification. 
9. 	 Stone (1970:396) also sees the significance of Foote's paper as a sup­
plement to role theory by providing an explanation of how one deter­
mines one's roles. 
10. 	 A similar "Grand 'Theory of Motivation" in sociology is advocated by 
Zetterberg (~957). 
11. 	 Meltzer's short analysis of the problem of motivation in Mead commits 
the same tautology as Foote. Meltzer (1967:18) says, 
In my judgement, a conception of motivation can be formulated 
that is both useful and consistent with Mead's theories. 
Motivation c'an refer to "a process of defining (symbolically, 
of course) the goal of an act". • I mean to designate 
"motive," however, the definition the individual makes, at 
any given time, of the objectives of his own specif~c acts. 
Here, again, the definition of an act is hypostatized into something 
different from the response itself. The act is based on the meaning 
or definition that precedes the response. Yet) this is a tautology 
because the meaning of a prior situation is given by the response to 
it. The meaning one imputes toward objects is not prior to the 
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response, but is given in the response. Making the m~aning i~to some­
thing different is redescription and redundancy. 
12. 	 For a discussion of the intricacies of normalizatio~ prQc~s~es see 
Davis (1967) and Roman' and Trice (1971). . 
13. 	 This behavioral determination of whether a motive is "real" or lIu~realn 
'has obvious advantage over Gerth and Mills' somewhat mystical approach. 
They suggest that: 
We may ,assume that the more deeply internalized in the person, 
and'the more clearly integrated with the psychic structure, a 
vocabulary of motive is, the greater is the chance that it con­
tains "the real motives." In fact, that is what ureal motives" 
may be assumed to mean. We must, in order to "test" motives, 
therefore, attempt to find out on what level of character struc­
ture a given vocabulary is integrated (Gerth and Mills, 1953: 
120). 
How such a test may be, carried out is never explained by Gerth and 
Mills. As indicated in the chapter on Mills, however, this somewhat 
mystical explanation of "real" motives is due to their misconception 
of meaning. Behavior does not result from the meaning of motives, 
the latter being conceptualized hypostatically as some kind of mental­
istic phenomenon, such as an "attitude," or "thought," or as a' "norm," 
or, "sttuation." The meaning of a motive is behaviorally derived, or' 
given by the response to it. It is only on the basis of this same 
logic that a determination of whether a motive is "real" or not can be 
made; i.e., on the response of the audience of either accepting the 
motive or rejecting it. 
14. 	 This situational understanding of stigma or deviance should therefore 
largely repudiate the tendencies of some theorists to make deviance a 
problem relative to only the codified laws of society (see Gibbons 
and Jones, 1971). Clearly, deviance involves the discrepancies in 
any situated act~on where self and others are judged. 
15. 	 It has also been argued that the indeterminant theory of action involved 
in a dramaturgical understanding of motives is "mystical" because it is 
said to imply notions of free will (see Bolton, 1971). This ~harge 
comes about largely by misconstruing the philosophy that underlies the 
dramaturgical theory of action and the sociology of dramaturgy. While 
Lyman and Scott (1970) correctly explain that dramaturgy has philosophic 
roots in modern existentialism that involves an emphasis on "freedom,u 
this is merely a tangential point that is not built in to the sociology 
of dramaturgy itself. Specifically the meaning of action is never 
explained to be problematic due to the inherent "free will," of the 
individual, or that "free will" causes action to be problematic. 
Rather, the meaning of action is explained to be problematic in terms 
Qf an empirically grounded behaviorism. Put simply, action is said 
to be problematic because responses from others and one's self are not 
mechanically given but highly variable. The prob1ematics of action is 
therefore given a strict sociological basis in dramaturgy. Since Mead, 
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responses have been understood as being uncertain. ,"Why" this is so 
is a moot point ,in dramaturgy. But it is'never said that it is 
because of "free will." 
16. This understanding leads a defense to dramaturgy toward the criticism 
by 	radical sociologists, namely Lichtman (1970; 1971) a~d Ho.rton 
(1971) that, by emphasizing the phenomenological aspects of reality 
as an on-going accomplishment, dramaturgy only amounts to a "do-it­
yourself, apolitical stance which can only affirm (apologize) by end­
lessly describing the reified construction of bourgeois reality" 
(Horton, 1971:189). For instance, radicals argue that 
It is not enough to know that the obj ect'ive appearance of ·real­
ity is managed; we want to know also why that objectivity is so 
oppressive and how it can be overcome (Horton, 1971:188). 
Thus Horton (1971:188) argues 
The Idramaturgica1] phenomenological method, whiie it contri­
butes to a theoretical understanding of reification, is 
clearly not a method for radical dereification, because it , 
cannot result in practical action against the reified social 
world. 
Ho:rton is arguing that dramaturgy can not result in "Praxis," which 
is a social-psychology involved in the Marxian concept of "dialecti­
cal thinking." Dialectical thought, which underlies Praxis, is 
explained by Schroyer (1971:132) as 
By first expressing what a totality holds itself to be, and 
then confronting it with what it is, a [dialectical] theory 
is able to break down the rigidity of the object. 
On the basis of di'alectical thought, therefore, it is argued that 
Praxis becomes possible; men' can not only see what "is" but what also 
"should be." 
The dramaturgical retort is that, in order to see what is, one can no 
longer be concerned with the question "why?" This is simply because 
the problem leads to infinite regression, and almost always ends in' 
tautology. Tautology, by the way, is Marxist's and radical sociolo­
gists' most common intellectual error. They are the most guilty of 
explaining the meaning of behavior on the basis of "productive 
forces," and "productive relations" which are both tautological reifi­
cations of action itself (see, for example, Marx, 1961). 
Dramaturgists would argue that to see what "is,tI which is the basis 
of dialectical thought and Praxis, one must discontinue the endless 
tendency to explain human actions on the basis of tautological inter­
pretations of behavior itself. Tautology merely reinforces a misin­
terpretation of what "is." The need, therefore, is for cogent 
description of action in its own terms. Only in this way can the 
fir.st moment of the dialectic, what "is," be comprehended. And. the 
meaning of what "is,". is what the actions of individuals on-gQingly 
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create, which is meaning. People have to be shown the creation of 
their own powers and actions. 
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